Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

Recent studies on strategic voting and entry in elections that combine plurality or majority and proportional representation (PR) have found candidate placement in single-member district (SMD) races to improve a party's PR performance. The primary implication of the existence of "contamination effects" is that parties have an incentive to nominate candidates in as many single-member districts as possible. Pre-electoral coordination in the majoritarian component of mixed electoral systems, however, is far from uncommon. In this article, we identify a number of institutional incentives that induce political parties to form pre-electoral alliances in spite of contamination effects. By identifying institutions that favor and hamper coordination, we seek to advance the understanding of PR-SMD interactions and to assess their implications for the design, classification, and empirical analysis of mixed electoral rules. Our statistical tests evaluate strategic entry in a diverse sample of countries.     

Do Theories of Punishment Necessarily Deliver a Binary System of Verdicts? An Exploratory Essay

Scholars writing on theories of punishment generally try to answer two main questions: what human behaviour should be punished and why? Only cursorily do they concern themselves with the question as to how confident in the occurrence of criminal behaviour we must be prior to punishing—i.e., the question of the criminal standard of proof. Theories of punishment are ultimately theories about choices of action—in particular, about how to treat individuals. If this is correct, it seems that they should not overlook one of the fundamental variables governing human decision-making: the uncertainty about the facts relevant to our acting. Now, the question as to whether existing theories of punishment require a standard of proof as high as ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ is gaining increasing attention in the scholarship. However, scholars working on theories of punishment give little attention to a particular way in which human decision-making handles the problem of uncertainty. In our everyday lives, we often decide in a many-valued, rather than a binary, fashion. Instead of having a single evidential threshold, the satisfaction of which determines whether we act or stay put, we tend to adjust our actions to our degree of confidence in certain states of affairs. In other words, we decide based on a ladder of evidential thresholds: the features of our actions vary according to the evidential threshold that we have satisfied. Notably, criminal trials do not follow this structure and theorists generally take this departure for granted. Why shouldn’t trials work as ‘ex post facto bets,’ whereby the response that the state is willing to ‘wager’ correlates with the fact finder’s confidence in the defendant’s guilt? The paper explores this question; in particular, it assesses whether the main theories of punishment (consequentialist, retributive, and communicative) necessarily deliver a binary system of verdicts. The work is part of a long-term research project on the comparison between the binary and the many-valued models of the system of criminal verdicts.     

The effects of university-level policies on women’s participation in academic patenting in Italy

The Journal of Technology Transfer - A growing stream of the academic literature has investigated the factors that hamper the participation of women researchers in patenting and commercialization...     

Equity in the Police Districting Problem: Balancing Territorial and Racial Fairness in Patrolling Operations

Journal of Quantitative Criminology - The Police Districting Problem concerns the definition of patrol districts that distribute police resources in a territory in such a way that high-risk areas...     

The erratic behaviour of the EU ETS on the path towards consolidation and price stability

The Kyoto Protocol envisages the use of various instruments to achieve emission reduction targets, one of which is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the most important market worldwide for CO₂ emission allowances. The volume of European Union Allowances traded represents over 45% of all the carbon dioxide generated by human activity within the continent. In its first two phases (2005–2012), the behaviour of the EU ETS was erratic, as a result of discretionary policies, an oversupply of allowances and reduced economic activity due to the global crisis. These factors caused excessively low prices that distorted the initial goals of achieving low-carbon solutions. From 2013, changes were made to the market regulation mechanisms in order to correct these structural deficiencies. Empirical analysis of daily prices in the two central phases of the market, following the pattern of ARCH and GARCH models, shows that the measures taken within the EU generated greater confidence and stability in the market and thus reduced volatility. Subsequent price behaviour, following a bullish path, has confirmed the success of the measures taken and their contribution to fulfilling emission reduction targets.     

Rethinking Italy’s Shrinking Place in the International Arena

Italy’s foreign policy is still shackled by two features inherited from its modern history: an obsessive focus on rank and prestige, and a no less delusional faith in the redemptive character of the EU and other multilateral arrangements it belongs to. The ‘middle power’ foreign policy model elaborated in the 1980s had a rationale of its own but it can hardly be adapted to the globalised world, nor can it be sustained by a deteriorated economic and societal domestic fabric. Italy has to rethink its basic national interests, adapt its foreign policy tools to new concepts of relevance and influence, and focus on a long-term, concerted effort at domestic regeneration if it is to withstand the challenges of the globalised world we live in.     

Frogs,mice and mixed electoral institutions: party discipline in Italy's XIV Chamber of Deputies1

Through the analysis of nearly 5,700 electronic votes cast by members of the Italian lower house, this article focuses on the electoral incentives shaping legislative behaviour in assemblies elected under mixed electoral rules. The study finds that the incentives indirectly engendered by the interaction between the majoritarian and proportional components of the Italian mixed system strengthen party discipline, which is high for every legislator type regardless of mandate and specialisation. Legislators elected in single-member districts are equally, if not more, susceptible to pressures to stick to the party line as their colleagues elected from a party list. Moreover, indicators of ‘electoral path’, like relative seat safety and dual candidacy, matter to party discipline more than simple seat type.