The commercialization of academic patents: black boxes,pipelines, and Rubik’s cubes

Drawing on histories of technological innovation originating from research by faculty at The Pennsylvania State University and Johns Hopkins University, this paper presents evidence for a “technology” as well as an “intellectual property rights” research approach to the commercialization of academic patents. By describing how inventor and firm activities and strategies affect the technical development and commercial positioning of university patents, a technology focus adds depth to the general proposition that university patents are embryonic technologies. It likewise serves as an analytical probe to reconsider other mainstream propositions about university technology transfer.     

Transferring superconductivity technology at a national-laboratory user center

Department of Energy national laboratories have long sought to expedite the transfer of commercially viable technologies to the private sector through publications and reports, workshops, the licensing of inventions, and personnel exchanges and other cooperative agreements between laboratories, industry, and universities. This article focuses on the transfer of patentable technologies through a case study of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory high temperature superconductivity Pilot Center (HTSC-PC). The Pilot Center was established in 1988 to encourage rapid incubation and commercialization of high temperature superconductivity technologies. The success of this venture will hinge upon assuring compatibility of objectives between the center and likely industrial participants and directing center efforts toward the aspirations of potential collaborators and the ultimate consumers of HTSC technologies. Lessons for general multi-program-laboratory technology transfer include the need for a model of collaboration that emphasizes openness and non-rigidity and facilitates the streamlining of information vital to the cross-fertilization of ideas, continuing reform of the licensing and royalty-sharing process, and simplifying the process of scientific exchange with external constituencies. David Lewis Feldman has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Missouri-Columbia. He serves on the staff of the Energy Division of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee where he does research on the environmental impacts of energy developments, international and comparative environmental policy, environmental regulation, and technology policy. He is the author of several articles and recently completed a book on natural resources policy in the US. He also serves as senior editor ofForum for Applied Research and Public Policy published at the University of Tennessee.     

A case of factitious pedophilia

Factitious disorder involves feigning, exaggerating, or self-inducing physical and/or psychological ailments with the goal of assuming the "sick" or "patient" role. In turn, the sick role entitles the factitious disorder patient to care, nurturance, and protection; it also exempts one from usual responsibilities. In this paper, we present the first reported case of factitious pedophilia. Although it seems counterintuitive, this middle-aged man has falsely claimed or exaggerated sexual desire for minors ostensibly to remain in a state hospital; indeed, he has remained in the same inpatient facility for more than 20 years as a result of his deceptions. At times, his reports have included disconfirmed claims of bizarre accidents and other physical travails. This case enlarges the literature on factitious psychological disorders and shows that some individuals may falsify paraphilic behaviors, although clearly minimization of these behaviors remains more common.     

Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic Regulatory Environment: An Experimental Study of Framing,Crowding Out,and Institutional Effects in the Context of Recycling Policies

In designing a recycling policy, the regulator must choose among multiple instruments. Our study seeks to address the linkages between the choice of regulatory instruments and institutional frameworks, people's intrinsic motivation, and various attitudinal measures. We examined the behavioral repercussions of several instruments that are used widely in recycling regulation, using an experimental survey on a representative sample of the Israeli population (N = 1,800 participants). Our findings suggest that the design of recycling policies should be sensitive to the framing effects of varied regulatory instruments and to the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the desirability and efficacy of the law. In particular, we point out the potential regulatory advantage of using deposit schemes over other instruments and of using private organizations as regulatory agents. Drawing on these findings, we discuss the potential value of using differentiated regulatory policies to provide incentives for recycling in societies characterized by broad heterogeneity in levels of intrinsic motivation.     

To Manage Is to Govern

Governance structures constrain and enable the actions of public managers. Principal–agent theory has played a dominant role in our understanding of governance structures. This theory suggests that politicians create relatively static governance structures in a top–down fashion and hold managers accountable for mandated results. In other words, public managers are influenced by governance structures but do not affect governance structures. However, we argue that public managers do affect governance structures, and, in order to understand how this influence takes place, we need a new way of thinking about governance structures. We propose thinking about governance structures as relationships created through the interactions of people in different and reciprocal roles that are relatively dynamic. Public managers are an important source of the multiple, reciprocal, and dynamic interactions that produce governance (relationship) structures. As such, managers are accountable not only for policy outcomes, but also for the appropriateness of the relationships they create and support.     

How Weak Recognition and Measurement in the Federal Budget Encouraged Costly Policy: The Case of "Supervisory Goodwill"

The budget process is the primary means by which federal policymakers allocate resources. The failure of the budget to recognize and measure the full cost of federal programs encourages the Congress and president to skew resource allocation toward policies whose budgetary costs are underestimated. These "low-cost" policies often increase costs to taxpayers without providing taxpayers with benefits. Recent examples of this phenomenon are found in the "supervisory goodwill" cases. This article reviews these cases, the budgetary weaknesses they identify, the influence these weaknesses had on legislators, and the unnecessary costs for taxpayers that result from the supervisory goodwill policy. Specifically, the federal budget did not recognize the cost that would result from encouraging financial institutions to assume the assets and liabilities of insolvent savings and loans. The budget's recognition of costs failed a second time by not recording expenditures when the government abrogated its contracts with acquirers. Both actions raised costs to taxpayers unnecessarily. In addition to analyzing budgetary weaknesses and their potential costs, this article also reviews two proposed budgetary reforms that could address the budgetary failures highlighted by the supervisory goodwill cases.