Mineralization of mandibular third molars can estimate chronological age--Brazilian indices

Forensic age estimation is an important element of anthropological research, as it produces one of the primary sources of data that researchers use to establish the identity of a person living or the identity of unknown bodily remains. The aim of this study was to determine if the chronology of third molar mineralization could be an accurate indicator of estimated age in a sample Brazilian population. If so, mineralization could determine the probability of an individual being 18 years or older. The study evaluated 407 panoramic radiographs of males and females from the past 5 years in order to assess the mineralization status of the mandibular third molars. The evaluation was carried out using an adaptation of Demirjian's system. The results indicated a strong correlation between chronological age and the mineralization of the mandibular third molars. The results indicated that modern Brazilian generation tends to demonstrate an earlier mandibular third molar mineralization than older Brazilian generation and people of other nationalities. Males reached developmental stages slightly earlier than females, but statistically significant differences between the sex were not found. The probability that an individual with third molar mineralization stage H had reached an age of 18 years or older was 96.8-98.6% for males and females, respectively.     

Vetospieler und die Durchsetzbarkeit von Side‐Payments

Once an agreement is signed at the international level, it can no longer be modified during the domestic decision‐making process. However, it is possible to compensate potential veto players by a purely domestic legislative act. Under which circumstances do such side‐payments make sense, and what is the role played by political strategies? In order to be compensated, an actor needs to be considered a veto player. Furthermore, the defenders of the international agreement must have a sufficiently large interest in its ratification to be willing to offer compensations. These basic conditions fulfilled, the existence or not of side‐payments depends on the strategic interactions between the political actors. In the last ten years, Swiss citizens had to vote twice on an international agreement establishing free movement of persons. In both cases, the unions asked for flanking measures; while they failed in their attempt in the context of the European Economic Area, they succeeded in the case of the bilateral agreements. This difference in outcome is all the more surprising since in both cases the unions were in a veto player position and the export oriented economy had a strong interest in the ratification of the agreements. This article explains the different fate of the unions' claims by stressing the role of changes in actor strategies. The credibility of the threat to block the decision‐making process and the succession of the game sequences are in this perspective of paramount importance. By using strategically the veto threat, domestic groups such as unions are able to benefit from internationalisation.