Generalized Social Trust and International Dispute Settlement

What determines the success of a peaceful settlement attempt of a border dispute? In order to fully understand why decision makers choose to put an end to an ongoing conflict, it is necessary to consider the social trust levels of the general populations in both states. International conflict settlement requires public support at the domestic level. If a state’s general population perceives the potential dangers of a settlement as too severe, the conclusion of a peace agreement will be difficult. We argue that high levels of social trust allow citizens (1) to favor more conciliatory foreign policies and (2) to be more optimistic about the future behavior of other states. In democratic settings, these public attitudes serve as powerful constraints for decision makers. As a result, high aggregate levels of social trust should be directly related to concession-granting behavior by democracies as well as effective dispute settlement among jointly democratic dyads. We test these expectations with a new aggregate-level measure of social trust and find mixed support for our hypotheses: While trust does not influence the behavior of challenger states, it does have strong effects on democratic target states and jointly democratic dyads.     

A failure of governmentality: why Transparency International underestimated corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia

This article critiques the Foucauldian approach to governance indicators. Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) underestimated Tunisian corruption levels under President Ben Ali: his regime was highly corrupt but foreign investors were less affected. CPI methodology meant it reflected primarily the needs of foreign investors. The Foucauldian approach specifically excludes analysis of governance indicators’ methodologies. It thus fails to demonstrate the effectiveness of governance indicators as a technology of government, and it fails to show how the production of the CPI is embedded in a wider global political economy.     

The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia

The article discusses the reasons for the ten-year delay in the democratic transition in Serbia, focusing in particular on opposition parties and civil society. It argues that the policy of opposition parties was partly responsible for the failure of an earlier fall of the Miloevic regime. While civil society has been similarly weak and divided, the article details how a number of NGOs proved to be crucial in the coordinated campaign which lead to the overthrow of the Miloevic regime in October 2000.     

De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum

Since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union (EU) has undergone significant changes. Once a model "Europeanist," Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Neither an instance of a planned strategic change nor a result of an inevitable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level, these changes in German foreign policy, incremental yet significant as they are, evade both deterministic and voluntaristic accounts of foreign policy change. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory, the article develops an innovative framework for analysis that is applied to Germany's European asylum and refugee policy as well as its security and defense policy. The origins of both policy fields at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany. However, as the 1990s progressed Germany increasingly obstructed further institutionalization. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam summit marks a clear turning point in Germany's position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defense proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field more broadly. An unanticipated consequence of earlier initiatives, in both cases Germany has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations it has helped to raise.     

Intervention at Risk: The Vicious Cycle of Distance and Danger in Mali and Afghanistan

In crisis-hit countries, intensive risk management increasingly characterizes the presence of international interveners, with measures ranging from fortified compounds to ‘remote programming’. This article investigates the global drive for ‘security’ from an ethnographic perspective, focusing on Afghanistan and Mali. By deploying the concepts of distance and proximity, the article shows how frontline ‘outsourcing’ and bunkering have generated an unequal ‘risk economy’ while distancing interveners from local society in a trend that itself generates novel risks. To conclude, the article asks whether alternative forms of proximity may help to break the vicious cycle of danger and distance at work in today’s crisis zones.     

Das Recht auf Wohnen

Seit Langem gibt es auf verschiedenen Ebenen – international, supranational und national – Diskussionen über die Implementierung sozialer Grundrechte; insbesondere auch eines Grundrechts auf Wohnen. Der folgende Beitrag versucht in einem ersten kurzen Abriss den Status quo dieser Thematik zu beleuchten und dann in einem zweiten Abschnitt m?gliche L?sungsvorschl?ge für eine verfassungsrechtliche Verankerung eines Rechts auf Wohnen in der ?sterreichischen Rechtsordnung darzustellen.     

Lobbygruppen im politischen Wettbewerb: Die Auswirkungen des Konkurrenzkampfes unter Interessengruppen auf deren Lobbyverhalten

Lobby groups face direct competition from each other, yet the level of competition they face varies and depends on the political issue area they compete in. This article investigates the question, how these differing intensities of competition affect the lobbying behavior of interest organizations. Based on data stemming from a survey among Swiss and German interest groups, this article establishes that the intensity of competition among lobby groups positively influences both directly lobbying politicians (inside lobbying) but also exercising influence indirectly via the media and the public (outside lobbying). Yet it is also demonstrated that the inside lobbying benefits more strongly from higher competition levels, hence interest organizations look for ways to directly influence politicians first when they are faced with stiffer competition.