How to Define Legislative Turnover? The Incidence of Measures of Renewal and Levels of Analysis

This article analyses different standard measures of legislative turnover. Two main concerns are discussed: (1) the very definition of turnover: incoming MPs versus first-term MPs; and (2) the level of analysis: the whole chamber versus political groups. To illustrate this discussion, turnover in the French lower chamber, the Assemblée Nationale, is studied. It is shown that the choice of a particular measure is not trivial since empirical results are affected by the definition adopted. If the distinction between incoming and first-term MPs does not greatly modify results, the choice of the level of analysis leads to contradictory results. It is shown that the very logic of electoral contests leads to renewal mostly among those who lost previous elections, while incumbent majorities that lose elections hardly experience renewal. As both these phenomena coexist for every single election, aggregate measures of turnover do not account for these contradictory tendencies and tend to concentrate on alternation rather than turnover.     

Prison and Democracy: Lessons Learned and Not Learned, from 1989 to 2009

Dostoevsky, Mandela, and others have long noted that prisons expose social realities, often hidden, particularly inequality and gaps between policy and practice. Prisons symbolize, mirror, and shape the communities and countries in which they exist. Although prisons informed and were intertwined with many of the defining moments of 1989, in the 20 years since, societies often failed to recognize the important role prison and punishment play in relationship to democracy. By not recognizing that “prison matters” in relationship to democracy, polities (whether in transition to democracy or established democracies) failed to adequately learn “prison lessons.” Starting with a case study of South Africa, this paper considers prisons during apartheid and under democratic governance. This case is connected to other comparative and international examples (including Russia, Brazil, and the USA) to identify five lessons learned and not learned concerning prison and democracy. First, policies and practices of imprisonment reflect social orders, especially structures of inequality and understandings of legitimate power and opposition. Second, countries transitioning to democracy seldom anticipate rising crime and invariably neglect the relevance of prisons. Third, nations do not adequately grapple with the role of prison in the past, especially the nondemocratic past. Fourth, in established and recent democracies, penal populism resulted as politicians defined prison as a solution to a host of social ills, ignoring the consequences of expanded punishment. Fifth, prisons shaped key substantive realities beyond their walls, from leadership to recidivism, scandals, fiscal deficits, and crises of legitimacy.     

Results of a curriculum intervention with seventh graders regarding violence in relationships

This research measured the effects of a violence prevention curriculum on the knowledge and attitudes of seventh grade health education students (N=239) about woman abuse using a valid and reliable inventory. Pretests, post-tests, and post-post-tests were administered to experimental and comparison groups. The experimental group received the curriculum intervention,Skills for Violence-Free Relationships. Significant differences were found between the experimental and comparison groups from pretest to post-test on both the knowledge (p=.0027) and attitude (p=.0089) sections of the inventory. This impact did not remain stable at post post-test. These results confirm those found in other studies and reinforce recommendations of the battered women’s movement to integrate violence-free principles into school curricula. Within the experimental group, significant gender differences were found only on the attitude section from post-test to post post-test (p=.0335); females showed greater change over time. Such limited change was not unexpected in a middle school population given the reported formative nature of the subjects’ gender acquisition as contrasted with those at an older age.     

L'herméneutique juridique entre hermétisme et dogmatisme. Le jeu de l'interprétation en droit

Sans résumé     

Trust and inter‐firm relations in developing and transition economies

The role of trust in facilitating economic growth has been highlighted in previous contributions to this journal. In order to take this debate forward, this article argues (1) that more attention needs to be given to the relationship between sanctions and trust, and (2) that it is worth distinguishing between the minimal trust for making markets effective and the extended trust required for deeper kinds of inter‐firm co‐operation to work. The article goes on to ask why minimal trust is lacking and so hard to construct in the republics of the former Soviet Union. It then examines how extended trust grows or can be made to grow in industrial supply chains and clusters in developing countries.     

Who Suffers the Penalty?: A Panel Data Analysis of Earnings Gaps in Vietnam

In spite of its predominant economic weight in developing countries, little is known about the informal sector earnings structure compared to that of the formal sector. Taking advantage of the rich VHLSS dataset in Vietnam, in particular its three wave panel data (2002, 2004, 2006), we assess the magnitude of various formal–informal earnings gaps while addressing heterogeneity at three different levels: the worker, the job (wage employment vs. self-employment) and the earnings distribution. We estimate fixed effects and quantile regressions to control for unobserved individual characteristics. Our results suggest that the informal sector earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job status and on their relative position in the earnings distribution. Penalties may in some cases turn into premiums. By comparing our results with studies in other developing countries, we draw conclusions highlighting Vietnam’s labour market specificity.