When is 100% inspection not enough? An analysis of three pickup truck front wheel assembly failures

The loss of a cotter pin in the front wheel assembly of cars and trucks has been a problem for several years. This is shown by the fact that the automobile manufacturers have been committed to a 100% inspection of the process for installing them on cars and trucks. In this paper, three accident cases are presented, along with a method by which the forensic engineer can determine if a cotter pin has ever been installed on the front wheel assembly. Testing was done to show what the spindle would look like if the cotter pin had been installed properly and forcibly removed. Photographs show both the accident and test spindle for comparison.     

The Case for Supply-Side Economics Revisited: The Effect of Time Preference

Despite some legitimate criticisms that are acknowledged, the basic idea behind the Laffer curve analysis of the 1980s is theoretically sound. Some of the fallacies and flaws that subsist in standard accounts of the general effects of taxation can be related to the fact that time preference is not taken into account. The primary significance of time preference has been insufficiently recognized in the mainstream literature. Apart from Buchanan's refinements of the Laffer curve analysis and besides the widespread recognition of the phenomenon of time preference by economists of the so-called Austrian school, amazingly little attention has been paid to it. This article constitutes an attempt to help remedy this situation. Moreover the Austrian analysis provides valuable insights concerning the problem of the incidence of taxation that haven't received proper recognition either.     

Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic?

This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the ‘partisan’ motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.     

A political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution

We present a two-country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor. Migration can be exogenous and/or endogenous (i.e., determined by labor income differentials). Political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups, where the latter can be affected by immigration. We show that immigration can increase the transfers to, and the income of, the mobile group. We also investigate the possibility of migration regulation, tax-transfer policy competition and coordination and, finally, coordination of regulation policies. It is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries.

     

The ruthless Fed: A critique of the AST hypothesis

This paper examines the hypothesis that the Great Contraction was the result of rational rent-seeking by members of the Federal Reserve System. In contrast to the AST hypothesis, evidence on the share prices of member banks that survived the contraction suggests that the owners of these banks suffered an absolute decline in real wealth and a decline relative to a broad spectrum of other investment alternatives. Furthermore, monetary surprises had no statistically discernible effect on the share prices of these banks. This evidence conflicts with the notion that rational rent-seeking would lead the owners of member banks and their bureaucratic conspirators in the Federal Reserve System to unleash a policy with the goal of contracting the money supply by 35 percent.     

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies — is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the ‘right direction’. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. qu]Much of the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form of freely provided “objective” studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks). qu]The analysis here is vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole, 1989: Ch. 1.3, p. 77, Rentseeking behavior).     

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies.An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.