Crimes against water: non-enforcement of state water pollution laws

In the United States water pollution is a serious problem criminalized not only by the federal government, but by all states. These laws vary greatly in content, but are widely disobeyed and universally under-enforced. Statutes, case law, histories and journalism show “law in action” typologies of non-enforcement efficacious for analysis including: (1) jurisdiction issues like federal pre-emption, inter-state compacts, and constitutional limitations; (2) legislative issues such as failure to legislate, or legislating ineffectively; (3) agency issues, including administrative obstacles, delegation, power vacuums, procedure, and “agency capture”; (4) policing issues like apathy, under-funding/training, jurisdictional confusion, and “following the path of least resistance”; (5) prosecutorial issues, including isolation, intimidation, and ideological priority bias; (6) trial and appellate court issues, including unclear culpability, erroneous holdings, bias, and lack of judicial independence; and (7) citizen, victim, and defendant issues, including legal intellectual influence, environmentalist criminalization apathy, industry lobbying, environmental justice, reporting failures, self-policing, ethics and flight. The conclusion is non-enforcement in this area of criminal law shows that while federally there may exist a relatively consistent, content neutral enforcement system, at the state level resistance to enforcement is seen across a number of fronts. Ultimately, states can be seens as colonized frontiers servicing venture capitalism, consistent with a “race to the bottom.”     

The Role of Experts in the European Union's Research Policy

This research analyzes the role of experts in the European Union's policy‐making process. Focusing on the field of research policy, this study seeks to probe how expert participation in the Open Method of Coordination informs policy decisions. The paper reports on an analysis of the expert group in the European Internationalization Strategy in Science and Technology. Our analysis reveals the dynamics of expert participation at the micro level, as it identifies who these experts are, how they are appointed, and in what ways expert knowledge gets used in policy making.     

Can Leviathan governments mitigate the tragedy of the commons?

This paper explores the conjecture whether the Leviathan motive of politicians — to tax for the purpose of raising revenues rather than for benevolent, Pigovian motives — helps to overcome the inefficiency of international pollution spillovers such as in the cases of acid rain and global warming. It turns out that this conjecture is true in a static context that captures flow externalities, e.g., acid rain, as long as environmental damages are not too high. In contrast, Leviathan motives aggravate the already existing inefficiency in the case of stock externalities (e.g., global warming) despite probably high taxes at the beginning.     

Reviews

Israel Getzler, Kronstadt 1917–1921: The Fate of a Soviet Democracy. London: Cambridge University Press, 1983, xii + 296 pp. £25.00.

Hans Dieter Seibel and Ukandi G. Damachi, Self‐Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World, London: Macmillan, 1982, 316 pp. £20.00. Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, The Economy of Yugoslavia, London: Croom Helm, and New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 279 pp. £19.95.

Steven Rosefielde, False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup. An Appraisal of the CIA's Direct Costing Effort, 1960–80. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1982, xxi + 340 pp. p/b $14.95.

Donald S. Zagoria (ed.), Soviet Policy in East Asia, London: Yale University Press, 1982, xiii+360 pp. £21.00.

Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula, London: Croom Helm, 1983, 191 pp. £13.95.

David Lane, The End of Social Inequality? Class, Status and Power Under State Socialism, London, Boston and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, x+208 pp. h/b £12.95. p/b £4.95.

P. J. Potichnyj and J. S. Zacek (eds.), Politics and Participation under Communist Rule, New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1983, xvii+282 pp. $29.95.

Vladimir G. Treml, Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study, Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982, xiii + 103 pp. $27.75.

R. Amann and J. M. Cooper (eds.), Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982, xxix+526 pp. £33.00.

Malcolm R. Hill, East‐West Trade, Industrial Co‐operation and Technology Transfer, London: Gower Publishing, 1983, xviii+217 pp. £15.00.

Roy Medvedev, (translated by Brian Pearce), Khrushchev, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, x + 292 pp. £9.50.

Roger Munting, The Economic Development of the USSR, London: Croom Helm, 1982, 228 pp. (with one map and 54 tables). £13.95.

David Rousset, The Legacy of the Bolshevik Revolution: A Critical History of the USSR, volume 1, London/New York: Allison and Busby, 1982, translated by Alan Freeman, 333 pp. h/b £13.95, p/b £5.95.     

Patterns of Disagreement in Democratic Politics: Comparing Germany, Japan, and the United States

An important ingredient in democratic politics is the experience of disagreement through social communication and political discussion. If people fail to encounter contrary viewpoints, their own views are never challenged, they are never forced to reconsider initially held opinions, and they are effectively excluded from democratic deliberation. This article examines patterns of political agreement and disagreement within the communication networks of citizens in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Several questions are addressed. Are there cross‐national differences in patterns of agreement and disagreement among citizens? To what extent are these patterns subject to individual attitudes, to the structure of communication networks, and to levels of aggregate support for particular preferences and opinions? Finally, what are the implications of disagreement for civic capacity and political engagement? Empirical analyses are based on cooperative election surveys conducted in each country during the early 1990s.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.