The dynamics of lobbying — A differential game

This paper presents a dynamic model on lobbying. The interactions between two competing lobbies, who attempt to influence regulations and legislation, are modelled as a differential game. We consider for this game first a time consistent and then a subgame perfect equilibrium (in linear Markov strategies). The subgame perfect equilibrium lowers considerably lobbying activity and expenses. This provides a partial explanation of the puzzle that rent-seeking expenses are often small compared with the prize sought.     

SMEs in Regional Innovation Systems and The Role of Innovation Support--The Case of Upper Austria

In the past large firms were regarded as the main driving forces for innovation, but, more recently, the interest has shifted to SMEs as well as networks of firms. It has been recognized that SMEs innovate in a specific way and that they face size-specific barriers. To be able to rely on innovation partners and to be involved in regional or national innovation systems seems to be of critical importance for SMEs. This paper presents the empirical results of a firm survey in Upper Austria, a region with a long industrial tradition in Austria, investigating the extent to which SMEs are actually engaged in innovation networks and the role of public innovation support in this context. The findings show that SMEs which have received innovation support are more successful innovators than those which have not, and that innovation cooperations are rather rare. Most external relations are with other firms and within the region, very few with knowledge providers from science and technology. At present, innovation support instruments do not sufficiently target the deficits of non-innovative SMEs and the problems in linking up with innovation networks and broadening firms' relations beyond the region.     

Interstate Cooperation and Territorial Representation in Intermestic Politics

Both the American and the German federal systems are actingunder the impact of increasing globalization and are involvedin processes of macro-regional integration. These developmentsare of vital interest for the constituent members of both federations.In such transformations, the nature of the representation ofsubnational units is a pivotal element. The crucial point iswhether the federation and/or the new transnational regimesprovide for the representation of subnational territorial unitsand give space for their horizontal cooperation.     

Voters' party preferences in multiparty systems and their coalitional and spatial implications: Germany after unification

How should party preferences of voters in a multiparty system be measured, compared and aggregated? We use city block metric of distances between the pairwise comparisons of the five German parties (1995 survey data for West and East Germany). Neither in West nor in East Germany, a party gains the absolute majority of voters' preferences. We derive coalition preferences from the party rankings; the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP is not the winner, compared with other feasible coalitions of the German party system. But the party rankings of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition leaners are more homogeneous than other groups of coalition leaners. In the second part of the article, we analyze the common structure of all consistent party rankings. Do voters apply the same criteria to evaluate the political parties? Although only a slight majority of individual rankings fit the often used ideological left-right scale, there does not exist a competing one-dimensional order of the parties that would capture more voters. The joint scale of individual party rankings is interpreted as the collective order which facilitates political orientation of voters. This collective order is more pronounced in West than in East Germany where individuals are almost as consistent in their party rankings but where the rankings fit the collective order less well than in West Germany.

     

Personalisierung der Politik in Mehrparteiensystemen am Beispiel deutscher Bundestagswahlen seit 1980

Personalization of politics is investigated as relative importance of leading politicians for the party vote (Zweitstimme) in German Bundestag elections, compared to the importance of parties and the recall of voting behavior in the last federal election. Contrary to recent German research on the impact of special candidate attributes (competence, integrity etc.) we interpret general evaluations of parties and the leading politicians as the most immediate utility attributes or distance measures of the options listed on the ballot. On the basis of this model, of discrete choice analysis as the statistical method and of the Politbarometer data of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim, we estimate candidate effects in three regions of Germany, characterized by slightly different party systems (West Germany without Bavaria, Bavaria with the CSU instead of the CDU and East Germany with the PDS as a more important party than the FDP or the Greens). It is shown that region is important for personalization, that a general trend towards increasing personalization does not exist, that the most popular politicians sometimes lose their capacity to attract voters to their party and that both attractiveness for floating voters and repulsiveness for former party voters must be taken into account when interpreting effect parameters.     

Crimes against water: non-enforcement of state water pollution laws

In the United States water pollution is a serious problem criminalized not only by the federal government, but by all states. These laws vary greatly in content, but are widely disobeyed and universally under-enforced. Statutes, case law, histories and journalism show “law in action” typologies of non-enforcement efficacious for analysis including: (1) jurisdiction issues like federal pre-emption, inter-state compacts, and constitutional limitations; (2) legislative issues such as failure to legislate, or legislating ineffectively; (3) agency issues, including administrative obstacles, delegation, power vacuums, procedure, and “agency capture”; (4) policing issues like apathy, under-funding/training, jurisdictional confusion, and “following the path of least resistance”; (5) prosecutorial issues, including isolation, intimidation, and ideological priority bias; (6) trial and appellate court issues, including unclear culpability, erroneous holdings, bias, and lack of judicial independence; and (7) citizen, victim, and defendant issues, including legal intellectual influence, environmentalist criminalization apathy, industry lobbying, environmental justice, reporting failures, self-policing, ethics and flight. The conclusion is non-enforcement in this area of criminal law shows that while federally there may exist a relatively consistent, content neutral enforcement system, at the state level resistance to enforcement is seen across a number of fronts. Ultimately, states can be seens as colonized frontiers servicing venture capitalism, consistent with a “race to the bottom.”