Agglomeration Effects: Productivity of the Informal Sector in Vietnam

This paper investigates agglomeration externalities on the productivity of informal household businesses in Vietnam. Although the paper finds heterogeneous impacts of agglomeration on the productivity of informal firms between urban and rural settings and across industries, it is found that technology transfers are not an agglomerative force for the informal sector of Vietnam. The disaggregation of local scale externalities into city types reveals that the highest developed cities in Vietnam may either be low-quality agglomeration or go beyond their optimal scale for the informal sector in some industries.     

Violent behavior and the factors associated with the decision to report it: a retrospective study

An ample volume of research evidence supports the conclusion that severe mental illness is correlated with violent behavior. While episodes of violent behavior are included in medical notes, not all episodes of violent behavior are officially reported to the police, even when they are actual crimes. We conducted a retrospective study on the already existing clinical files of four public psychiatric outpatient facilities, based in Southern Italy, in order to assess how many cases of violent behavior are actually reported and which variables are more frequently connected with the decision to report. The data shows that the episodes known to the health services, in number and seriousness, vastly outnumber the complaints actually made towards their patients.     

How Parties Create Electoral Democracy,Chapter 2

Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.     

THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro‐level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual‐level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self‐reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link—ignored in previous research—is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty‐four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence‐based rationales for more punitive crime control policies.     

Characterisation of 12 new alleles in the STR system D18S51

D18S51 alleles 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 40 were detected and sequenced; these new alleles are mistyped with commercial STR kits, causing presumptive null alleles or false exclusions when paternity testing.     

Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico

This article reexamines the argument that targeted programs increase pro‐incumbent voting by persuading beneficiaries to cast ballots against their first partisan choice. The evidence comes from the randomized component of Progresa, the pioneering Mexican conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. Experimental data show that early enrollment in the program led to substantive increases in voter turnout and in the incumbent’s vote share in the 2000 presidential election. The experiment also reveals that opposition parties’ vote shares were unaffected by the program. Thus, the electoral bonus generated by CCTs may be best explained by a mobilizing rather than persuasive mechanism. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the notion that the electoral effects of CCTs are a result of prospective concerns triggered by threats of program discontinuation or endogenous program enrollment. Instead, the evidence in this article suggests that CCTs’ mobilizing effects are compatible with programmatic politics.     

De Gaulle,Colonel Passy and British Intelligence, 1940–42

De Gaulle's relationship with his secret intelligence and subversive services, the Bureau central de renseignements et d'action (BCRA) headed by Colonel Passy, as well as with British intelligence is examined in the light of the now declassified archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the BCRA. These archives reveal that de Gaulle failed to interest himself seriously in secret intelligence or subversion before the arrival of Jean Moulin in London in October 1941. De Gaulle's subsequent relationship with the BCRA and British intelligence was defined by an obsessive need for political control, which only served to compromise the BCRA's otherwise successful collaboration with British intelligence.