CORRELATES OF VIOLENT POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES*

Although research on terrorism has grown rapidly in recent years, few scholars have applied criminological theories to the analysis of individual‐level political extremism. Instead, researchers focused on radicalization have drawn primarily from political science and psychology and have overwhelmingly concentrated on violent extremists, leaving little variation in the dependent variable. With the use of a newly available data set, we test whether variables derived from prominent criminological theories are helpful in distinguishing between nonviolent and violent extremists. The results show that variables related to social control (lack of stable employment), social learning (radical peers), psychological perspectives (history of mental illness), and criminal record all have significant effects on participation in violent political extremism and are robust across multiple techniques for imputing missing data. At the same time, other common indicators of social control (e.g., education and marital status) and social learning perspectives (e.g., radical family members) were not significant in the multivariate models. We argue that terrorism research would benefit from including criminology insights and by considering political radicalization as a dynamic, evolving process, much as life‐course criminology treats more common forms of crime.     

The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States

Term limits on legislators were adopted in 21 states during the early 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the limits legally barred incumbents from reelection in 11 states, and they will do so in four more by 2010. In 2002, we conducted the only survey of legislators in all 50 states aimed at assessing the impact of term limits on state legislative representation. We found that term limits have virtually no effect on the types of people elected to office—whether measured by a range of demographic characteristics or by ideological predisposition—but they do have measurable impact on certain behaviors and priorities reported by legislators in the survey, and on the balance of power among various institutional actors in the arena of state politics. We characterize the biggest impact on behavior and priorities as a “Burkean shift,” whereby term‐limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns. The reform also increases the power of the executive branch (governors and the bureaucracy) over legislative outcomes and weakens the influence of majority party leaders and committee chairs, albeit for different reasons.     

EXPLAINING JAPAN'S POSTWAR VIOLENT CRIME TRENDS*

Japan has long been recognized for its low rates of violent crime, rates that usually seem to be declining. The most common explanation for postwar rates links unique cultural characteristics to a system of exceptionally effective informal social controls that, at the macro level, suggest low levels of social disorganization. Other common explanations include low levels of economic stress, a small proportion of young males and a criminal justice system that delivers a high certainty of punishment. In this paper we test these four explanations for Japanese trends using both an annual time‐series national analysis (1951 to 2000) and a pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of the 47 Japanese prefectures from 1955 to 2000 (at 5‐year intervals). The results from the two analyses are largely congruent. They show that measures of economic stress, certainty of punishment and age structure are–compared to common social disorganization measures–more consistent predictors of Japanese postwar violent crime trends. Our results suggest that the remarkable strength of the postwar Japanese economy may play a larger role in explaining Japanese violent crime rates than is usually recognized.     

TESTING A RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL OF AIRLINE HIJACKINGS*

Using data that combines information from the Federal Aviation Administration, the RAND Corporation and a newly developed database on global terrorist activity, we are able to examine trends in 1,101 attempted aerial hijackings that occurred around the world from 1931 to 2003. We have especially complete information for 828 hijackings that occurred before 1986. Using a rational choice theoretical framework, we use continuous‐time survival analysis to estimate the impact of several major counterhijacking interventions on the hazard of differently motivated hijacking attempts and logistic regression analysis to model the predictors of successful hijackings. Some of these interventions use certainty‐based strategies of target hardening to reduce the perceived likelihood of success. Others focus on raising the perceived costs of hijacking by increasing the severity of punishment. We also assess which strategies were most effective in deterring hijackers whose major purpose was related to terrorism. We found support for the conclusion that new hijacking attempts were less likely to be undertaken when the certainty of apprehension was increased through metal detectors and law enforcement at passenger checkpoints. We also found that fewer hijackers attempted to divert airliners to Cuba once that country made it a crime to hijack flights. Our results support the contagion view that hijacking rates significantly increase after a series of hijackings closely clustered in time—but only when these attempts were successful. Finally, we found that the policy interventions examined here significantly decreased the likelihood of nonterrorist but not that of terrorist hijackings.     

EXPANDING CRIMINOLOGY'S DOMAIN: THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY 2006 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS*

Democracy is directly linked to the two main components of criminology: crime and justice. Moreover, the scientific study of crime and justice has been limited in large part to researchers working in democratic regimes. In this article, I address the question of how criminologists through research and education can better nurture democratic, nonauthoritarian societies. I argue that our field would be strengthened by expanding the domain of criminology in five directions: 1) by providing more emphasis on historical data and analysis, 2) by broadening the scope of emotions we test for among offenders, 3) by doing more cross‐national comparative analysis, 4) by bringing situational variables into our research, and 5) by making criminology more interdisciplinary. Although the most recent wave of democratization produced a record number of democratic regimes, we are observing ominous challenges to fundamental democratic rights from around the world. As criminologists, we have a vested interest in supporting the democratic, nonauthoritarian societies in which our craft has thrived.