Giant Diaphragmatic Lipoma: Two Autopsy Case Reports and Review of the Literature

Lipomas are common benign tumors most frequently found within the subcutaneous areas of the body. Deep-seated lipomas are rare and tend to be larger than cutaneous ones. Lipomas are rarely seen in the thoracic cavity, and they are usually located in the mediastinum, bronchiole, and lungs. Diaphragmatic lipomas have been occasionally reported in the literature, the first being described by Clark et al. in 1886. The authors report two rare cases of giant diaphragmatic lipoma incidentally found during forensic autopsies. In the first case, a Caucasian 85-year-old woman burned to death with another passenger, after her methane-fueled car collided with another car on a highway near Terni, Umbria, Italy. In the second case, a Caucasian 45-year-old man collapsed while walking through the countryside of Perugia. In either case, a large mass in the thorax was observed. The definitive pathologic diagnosis was giant intrathoracic diaphragmatic lipoma without evidence of malignancy. The authors also review the relevant literature and discuss differential diagnoses. These case reports contribute to the establishment of the actual incidence of diaphragmatic lipomas.     

Adapting to Lisbon: Reforming the Role of German Landesparlamente in EU Affairs

In Europeanisation studies subnational parliaments are so far treated as a quantité négligeable – despite the fact that their key functions are strongly affected by European integration and they are perceived as losers of European integration. Given the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which acknowledges a role for subnational parliaments on subsidiarity issues, and given the concept of parliamentary ‘responsibility for integration’ introduced by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, this represents a substantial gap. These recent changes in the institutional environment have led to a wave of reforms in the German Landesparlamente concerning their EU-related functions. The key strategy is strengthening the control function vis-à-vis the Länder governments. The high degree of convergence in terms of control strategies and instruments is explained by the fact that these reforms follow by and large the path adopted in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, but with some interesting modifications.     

Is there a “Depth versus Participation” dilemma in international cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.