Collaborative Behavior and the Performance of Government Agencies

ABSTRACT

While collaboration among individuals, work groups, and organizations is central for understanding the performance of public agencies, most studies have focused on collaboration between organizations or sectors. We develop a model that focuses on two types of collaborative behavior: between persons (both horizontal and vertical) and between work units. We empirically test our hypotheses using data on work collaboration and perceptions of public agency performance from the United States federal government. We introduce a method for estimating the impact of different types of collaborative behavior that also accounts for nonlinear effects and a dependent variable that takes ordered values. We find that intra-organizational collaborative behavior has a large impact on organizational performance and that horizontal collaborative behavior between workers has the greatest impact among the specific types.     

Regional prosperities compared: Massachusetts and Baden-Württemberg in the 1980s

This article compares the relationship between economic development and public policy in two of the most prosperous regions of the 1980s: Massachusetts in the United States and Baden-Württemberg in West Germany. Beginning with a critique of the theory of the product life-cycle, the article examines the rise and fall of traditional industries in Massachusetts and their survival in Baden-Württemberg. It then goes on to consider the rise–but also the vulnerability–of the high-tech and financial firms in Massachusetts, as well as the more robust, though almost invisible growth of these sectors in Baden-Württemberg. The burden of the argument is that there are, strictly speaking, no ‘mature’ industries and public policies aimed at stimulating innovation are most successful when the latter is integrated into the local industrial structure as a whole rather than isolated into a distinct high-tech sector.     

Presidential Party,Incumbency, and the Effects of Economic Fluctuations on House Elections, 1916–1996

There is little professional consensusregarding the effect of economic conditionson House Elections. We argue that recentwork still uses the paradigm of Party toorganize their data and tests. Given thatrecent developments in the theory ofcongress emphasize the paradigm ofIncumbency, we investigate the empiricalrelevance of that competing paradigm. Weshow that (1) Incumbency matters in a purePresidential Party Model of HouseElections, (2) Presidential Party mattersin a pure Incumbency Model, (3) Once bothParty and Incumbency are accounted for,economic conditions exert a highlysignificant and temporally stable influenceon House elections, (4) Return Rates aremore affected by economic fluctuations thanare Vote Shares, and (5) Not allPresidential Party incumbents face the samedegree of electoral accountability foreconomic fluctuations.     

ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS

Abstract: Traditionally public policy analysis has been able to employ the conceptual framework offered by the theory of market failure in order to evaluate the efficiency of market outcomes. However, until fairly recently, no corresponding analytical structure existed which could facilitate the examination of the efficiency and equity characteristics of government or non-market outcomes. Quite apart from public choice theory, an embryonic normative theory of government failure has now been developed which can act as a conceptual analogue to the market failure paradigm. At present, three theories of government failure coexist in the literature: Wolf's theory of non-market failure; Le Grand's theory of government failure; and Vining and Weimer's theory of govern- ment production failure. These models form the basis for a more universal theory of government failure. Nevertheless, in its current state of development this seminal literature can still assist in rational public policy design subject to certain caveats. Foremost amongst these is the need for policy analysts to augment the efficiency and equity criteria with some additional broader normative measures, and the necessity for care to be taken in the use of allocative efficiency as a benchmark in non-market circumstances.     

Explaining differences in productive efficiency: An application to Belgian municipalities

The purpose of this paper is to measure and explain variations in productive efficiency of municipal governments in Belgium. Technical efficiency is evaluated using a non-parametric method based on the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) reference technology. We first calculate input, output, and graph Farrell efficiency measures for a cross-section of all 589 Belgian municipalities. In a second stage of the analysis we explain the calculated differences in efficiency in terms of variables related to the structural characteristics of municipalities and to the institutional environment.