Norms and Military Power: nato's War Against Yugoslavia

Norms are fundamental constitutive elements of modern military power. Because norms influence military behavior and force structure, contemporary Western military power is produced only by interaction of normative and material factors. Two norms—the civilian casualty avoidance norm and Western societies' demand that their military forces take minimal casualties, or the force protection norm—more strongly influenced the origin, conduct, and outcome of nato's 1999 war against Yugoslavia than the material disparities of mismatched adversaries. Many actors, including the Yugoslav government and the Kosovo Liberation Army, notice the linkage of norms to Western military force structures and operational behavior and therefore strategically use norms instrumentally against states that adopt them. Such strategies generate technological and tactical responses, leading in turn to counter-responses—a dynamic interaction of material and normative factors that increasingly influence military operational outcomes.     

Mock jurors’ expectations regarding the psychological harm experienced by rape victims as a function of rape prototypicality

We examined mock jurors’ judgments in a rape case that was either prototypical (late-night assault by a stranger in a public place) or non-prototypical (daytime assault by an acquaintance in a private home). We also varied the psychological harm experienced by the victim as a result of the rape (mild anxiety or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)). We hypothesized that participants’ expectations regarding the level of harm the victim is likely to experience would mediate the effect of harm level on ratings of the victim’s credibility, and this indirect effect would be contingent on the prototypicality of the case. In a pilot experiment we demonstrated that people expect prototypical rape cases to be more traumatic for victims than non-prototypical cases. In the main experiment, and as predicted, participants in the Prototypical condition expected the victim to develop PTSD more than mild anxiety, but Non-Prototypical condition participants expected the opposite. In addition, a level of harm that was consistent rather than inconsistent with their expectations led participants to rate the victim as more credible; they also rated her as less responsible for what happened, and they thought the defendant was more likely guilty and that he should be incarcerated for a longer period of time.     

Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?

The role of intelligence in determining outcomes of battles and wars has varied dramatically across conflicts and time, contributing to wide differences in judgments about the importance of intelligence in war. Some analysts minimize the importance of intelligence while others argue it is essential. Opposing perspectives often do not engage each other’s points and generalize from small samples of conflicts. The result is a disjointed discussion of the roles and importance of intelligence in armed conflicts. This article’s aim is to partially rectify this situation by deriving an analytic framework that links intelligence to military operations and strategic outcomes.     

Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars

Critics of US intelligence focus extensively on the alleged inability and unwillingness of intelligence agencies to learn and adapt. Analysis of eight counterinsurgency wars suggests instead that external factors largely influence the intelligence-related performance of whole governments, including organizational structures, unity of effort and command, adequacy of resources, and leadership quality. Assessment of the performance of US intelligence since 9/11 indicates that the same variables influence the performance of US intelligence, suggesting that the US intelligence reform debate focuses too narrowly and on the wrong factors.     

Favorite INTs: how they develop,why they matter

Collection of important information is a critical part of the intelligence business. Less recognized and studied is the differential use of types of intelligence information based on personal and organizational preferences for, and biases against, specific intelligence collection disciplines, or ‘INTs’. This article presents a framework for assessing the implications of ‘favorite INTs’ for policy-making, policy implementation, and intelligence analysis. The record shows that favorite INTs negatively influence analysts and the use of intelligence by senior political leaders and military commanders. Practitioners can improve intelligence support and scholars can better understand how intelligence influences decision-making by appreciating how and why favorite INTs develop and influence decision-makers and analysts.