<Emphasis Type="Bold">Grundbuchsrecht</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

Grundbuchsrecht     

Religion und Religiosit?t als Ursache von Homonegativit?t

Although the attitudes towards homosexuality have become more liberal especially in industrialized Western countries, there is still a huge variance in terms of the levels of homonegativity worldwide. This article seeks to explain this variance by means of a multi-level-analysis of 79 countries. The data stem from the last two waves of the World Values Survey. On the basis of this data, the article focuses on the power of the religious denomination of a person and her religiousness in order to explain her attitude towards homosexuality; for both variables a strong influence can be detected. In addition, the article indicates that, on the individual level, socio-demographic variables??e.g. age, gender, education, marital status or profession??are highly interconnected with the intensity of homonegativity. On the country-level, however, the main explanatory factors are both the economic development and the communist heritage. The article further highlights significant conditional relationships by introducing cross-level interactions and interaction terms on the individual level. The final model explains about 60% of the variance on the aggregate level and 30% on the individual level.     

Who captures whom? Regulatory misperceptions and the timing of cognitive capture

To explain cognitive capture, economic sociologists often examine the structure of relationships between regulators and market participants. This paper argues that the nature of regulators' misperception should be subject to analysis as well. Different types of misperceptions develop over timelines of varying lengths. Depending on the misperception, different sets of relationships and parties may therefore be the cause of regulators' capture. The paper illustrates this point with a case study of regulators' failure to detect pervasive market power in California's electricity markets between 1998 and 2001. Existing explanations focus on sellers' short-term attempts to distract regulators from widespread evidence of market power. Using data from three archives and in-depth interviews, I show that the regulators did not fall prey to such “information problems.” Instead, their misperception resulted from a more foundational “worldview problem.” This error affects regulators' basic conception of the marketplace and can be traced to earlier and more gradual forms of influence exerted by utilities that, ironically, would become the victims of market power.