Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.     

Redistribution of work and income in the crisis: Actors' problems of working time reduction and a guaranteed basic income

In the present mass unemployment the ability of working time reduction to redistribute work and income becomes more clearly limited. In this paper I explore the feasibility of combining a guaranteed basic income with working time reduction in order to enhance the redistribution of work and income in the crisis. An important problem arises however when these programs are combined. The demand for working time reduction applies to a narrower range of interests, but integrates them more strongly, whereas the demand for a guaranteed basic income affects a wider range of interests, but integrates them less strongly. I call this the collectivity dilemma. The solution of this dilemma demands relatively complex cognitive reflexions on the part of the social actors involved.Translated by Andrew Watt     

Crises and their interpretations

Crises are interpreted facts. Thus the sociological term crisis implies that a certain period of economic and political development has been in practice already interpreted as a crisis. Therefore the comparison between the crises 1929 ff. (the beginning of the first world economic crisis and the beginning of the destruction of the first Austrian Republic) and 1974 (the first oilprizeshock and the end of full employment in Western Europe) in Austria must consider two dimensions. First, the authors compare some key-data of the economic and political development. Second, they compare interpretations of the crises by analyzing articles from two Austrian newspapers in each period. The comparison shows-as expected-important differences between the two crises. But it also draws the attention to some unexpected similarities.     

Consistency in sentencing: Recommendation to member states and explanatory memorandum

Documents

Consistency in sentencing: Recommendation to member states and explanatory memorandumCouncil of Europl     

Voters' wrath? Policy change and government popularity

Recent research suggests that voters are bad at responding in a meaningful way to policy events when deciding for whom to vote. Voters rely on so‐called “blind retrospection”, punishing governments for events outside politicians' control. However, another core aspect of the blind retrospection perspective has not been put to the test: are voters unable to respond to policy decisions that clearly are under the politicians' control? We construct a unique large‐N dataset on legislative changes in German old age pensions and unemployment protection to see if cutbacks and expansions lead to lower/higher support for the government. Our data are exceptionally fine‐grained and allow us to track the policy‐vote link for 416 months from 1977 to 2013 with a total of 329,167 respondents. We find substantial support for the notion that voters react in a meaningful way to policy changes, but also that they can be distracted by high‐profile, extreme events.     

William R. Keech: in Memoriam

Public Choice - We analyze the non-contributory health insurance program (“green cards”) in Turkey with RDD (Regression Discontinuity Design) and show that more citizens receive green...     

Different by Design? Analyzing How Governments Justify GMO Liberalization through the Lens of Strategic Communication

GMO liberalization can be seen as politically risky for policy actors; it confronts them with policy‐specific strategic challenges and incentives regarding their policy communication. This perspective has received much more attention in association with two other kinds of policies, welfare state retrenchment and foreign policy. The aim of this paper is thus to situate GMO liberalization within a larger framework and to examine how governments deal with this kind of policy through their communication. The analysis looks at the liberalization of GMOs in Norway and the UK to examine how their communication depends on policy characteristics as well as country‐specific conditions. The findings suggest that the communication of GMO liberalization differs markedly from the communication of welfare state retrenchment and foreign military interventions and that the typical features of GMO policies as well as the sociocultural context of the two countries mattered for how the governments have communicated GMO liberalization.     

Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte, Politisches System der Bundesrepublik, Politische Soziologie, Vergleichende Politikforschung, Europäische Union, Internationale Politik, Historische Politikforschung

Inhaltsübersicht   (RezensentInnen in Klammern) Literaturbericht    J?rg Faust / Stefan Leiderer: Zur Effektivit?t und politischen ?konomie der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte    Bluhm, Harald, und Jürgen Gebhardt: Politische Ideengeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Konzepte und Kritik (Philipp H?lzing) • Dryzek, John S., Bonnie Honig und Anne Phillips (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Johannes Schmidt) • Ke?ler, Mario: Ossip K. Flechtheim. Politischer Wissenschaftler und Zukunftsdenker (1909–1998) (Wilhelm Bleek) • Priester, Karin: Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen (Florian Hartleb) • S?llner, Alfons: Fluchtpunkte. Studien zur politischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Michael Becker) • Williams, Bernard: In the Beginning Was the Deed. Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Carsten Quesel) • Doppelrezension: Henning, Christoph: Philosophie nach Marx. 100 Jahre Marxrezeption und die normative Sozialphilosophie der Gegenwart in der Kritik; Henning, Christoph (Hg.): Marxglossar (Felix Heidenreich) • Doppelrezension: Mouffe, Chantal: über das Politische. Wider die kosmopolitische Illusion; Nonhoff, Martin: Politischer Diskurs und Hegemonie. Das Projekt "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" (André Brodocz) Politisches System der Bundesrepublik    Van Ooyen, Robert Chr., und Martin H. M?llers (Hg.): Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System (Hubert Woltering) Politische Soziologie    Dolata, Ulrich, und Raymund Werle (Hg.): Gesellschaft und die Macht der Technik. Sozio?konomischer und institutioneller Wandel durch Technisierung (Georg Simonis) Vergleichende Politikforschung    Castles, Francis G. (ed.): The Disappearing State? Retrenchment realities in an age of globalization (Marius R. Busemeyer) • Clasen, Jochen, und Nico A. Siegel (eds.): Investigating Welfare State Change: The 'Dependent Variable Problem' in Comparative Analysis (Marius R. Busemeyer) Europ?ische Union    Huget, Holger: Demokratisierung der EU. Normative Demokratietheorie und Governance-Praxis im europ?ischen Mehrebenensystem (Andreas Wimmel) Internationale Politik    Eder, Franz, Gerhard Mangott und Martin Senn (eds.): Transatlantic Discord. Combating Terrorism and Proliferation, Preventing Crises (Alexander Siedschlag) • Marx, Johannes: Vielfalt oder Einheit der Theorien in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion, Integration und Bewertung (Ralf J. Leiteritz) • Schmidt, Siegmar, Gunter Hellmann und Reinhard Wolf (Hg.): Handbuch zur Deutschen Au?enpolitik (Helga Haftendorn) • Wolter, Detlev: A United Nations for the 21st Century: From Reaction to Prevention. Towards an Effective and Efficient International Regime for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (Andreas Heinemann-Grüder) • Young, Brigitte (Hg.): Die Politische ?konomie des Dienstleistungsabkommens (GATS). Gender in EU und China (Eva Hartmann) Historische Politikforschung    Kaelble, Hartmut: Sozialgeschichte Europas 1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Siegfried Weichlein) • Doppelrezension: Andres, Jan: "Auf Poesie ist die Sicherheit der Throne gegründet". Huldigungsrituale und Gelegenheitslyrik im 19. Jahrhundert; Schwengelbeck, Matthias: Die Politik des Zeremoniells. Huldigungsfeiern im langen 19. Jahrhundert (Rainer Schmidt)     

The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions

An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policy makers in separation‐of‐powers systems are central to understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness can reflect efforts to resolve core tradeoffs associated with judicial policymaking that bear some resemblance to standard accounts of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide likely defiance from public view. At the same time, vagueness removes a central source of pressure for compliance that judges can place on other policy makers. Using a game‐theoretic model, we identify conditions under which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard delegation accounts.