"Theory of Mind" and Executive Functioning in Forensic Patients with Schizophrenia

Abstract:  Previous studies in forensic patients with schizophrenia have shown that delinquent patients may outperform nondelinquent patients with regards to "theory of mind" (ToM). Findings were, however, confounded by a lack of control for executive functioning. We examined 33 forensic patients with schizophrenia regarding ToM, intelligence, executive functioning, and psychopathology. Results were compared with a nonforensic schizophrenia sample and a group of healthy controls. Both patient groups performed more poorly on most measures compared with controls. Forensic and nonforensic patients did not differ in task performance. In the forensic group ToM correlated inversely with "excitement" and cognitive symptoms. When "excitement" was covaried out, forensic patients outperformed nonforensic patients with regards to ToM. This study supports the hypothesis that schizophrenic patients with a criminal record are equally impaired in their ability to infer mental states compared with nonforensic patients, but for different reasons associated with a divergent psychopathological profile.     

Die Genossenschaftswohnung in der Exekution

Nachdem der OGH bereits in zwei Entscheidungen die Verwertung eines Kleingartenhauses und einer Genossenschaftswohnung im Konkurs trotz § 5 Abs 4 KO gebilligt hatte, hat er nunmehr in einer neuen Entscheidung die Verwertung einer Genossenschaftswohnung im Exekutionsverfahren – wenn auch mit Einschr?nkungen – für zul?ssig erkl?rt. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt die Entscheidung vor und untersucht einige sich hier stellende Folgeprobleme.     

Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?

This paper studies the effects of a minimum price fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association on service quality and consumer surplus. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional association will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality, the association’s price will be too high if measured by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a deregulated market will always reproduce the favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand, while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services.     

Starker Steuerwettbewerb – starke Reformen? Ein neuer Blick auf Unternehmenssteuerreformen in 15 EU‐Staaten (1998‐2011)

Although many EU‐countries have reduced corporate taxes in the recent years, there is still a substantial variance between the 12 oldest EU‐member states. This contribution revisits this variation and analyses the determinants of corporate tax reforms and their magnitude from a perspective which is new in two respects: First, we combine logistic panel regression and fsQCA analysis allowing for an integration of qualitative assessments of tax reforms in the QCA analysis. This adds to the existing studies on tax reform which almost exclusively rely on regression techniques. Second, we focus on the time period 1998‐2011 where we expect tax competition to be especially intense. The results of our analyses confirm the major impact of tax competition on national corporate tax policies. This relationship dominates the regression analyses as well as the fsQCA. Furthermore, our findings allow nuancing the existing results on the influence of institutional constraints and partisan politics.     

Who captures whom? Regulatory misperceptions and the timing of cognitive capture

To explain cognitive capture, economic sociologists often examine the structure of relationships between regulators and market participants. This paper argues that the nature of regulators' misperception should be subject to analysis as well. Different types of misperceptions develop over timelines of varying lengths. Depending on the misperception, different sets of relationships and parties may therefore be the cause of regulators' capture. The paper illustrates this point with a case study of regulators' failure to detect pervasive market power in California's electricity markets between 1998 and 2001. Existing explanations focus on sellers' short-term attempts to distract regulators from widespread evidence of market power. Using data from three archives and in-depth interviews, I show that the regulators did not fall prey to such “information problems.” Instead, their misperception resulted from a more foundational “worldview problem.” This error affects regulators' basic conception of the marketplace and can be traced to earlier and more gradual forms of influence exerted by utilities that, ironically, would become the victims of market power.