Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?

This paper studies the effects of a minimum price fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association on service quality and consumer surplus. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional association will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality, the association’s price will be too high if measured by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a deregulated market will always reproduce the favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand, while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services.     

Starker Steuerwettbewerb – starke Reformen? Ein neuer Blick auf Unternehmenssteuerreformen in 15 EU‐Staaten (1998‐2011)

Although many EU‐countries have reduced corporate taxes in the recent years, there is still a substantial variance between the 12 oldest EU‐member states. This contribution revisits this variation and analyses the determinants of corporate tax reforms and their magnitude from a perspective which is new in two respects: First, we combine logistic panel regression and fsQCA analysis allowing for an integration of qualitative assessments of tax reforms in the QCA analysis. This adds to the existing studies on tax reform which almost exclusively rely on regression techniques. Second, we focus on the time period 1998‐2011 where we expect tax competition to be especially intense. The results of our analyses confirm the major impact of tax competition on national corporate tax policies. This relationship dominates the regression analyses as well as the fsQCA. Furthermore, our findings allow nuancing the existing results on the influence of institutional constraints and partisan politics.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Grundbuchsrecht</Emphasis>

Rechtsprechung

Grundbuchsrecht     

Religion und Religiosit?t als Ursache von Homonegativit?t

Although the attitudes towards homosexuality have become more liberal especially in industrialized Western countries, there is still a huge variance in terms of the levels of homonegativity worldwide. This article seeks to explain this variance by means of a multi-level-analysis of 79 countries. The data stem from the last two waves of the World Values Survey. On the basis of this data, the article focuses on the power of the religious denomination of a person and her religiousness in order to explain her attitude towards homosexuality; for both variables a strong influence can be detected. In addition, the article indicates that, on the individual level, socio-demographic variables??e.g. age, gender, education, marital status or profession??are highly interconnected with the intensity of homonegativity. On the country-level, however, the main explanatory factors are both the economic development and the communist heritage. The article further highlights significant conditional relationships by introducing cross-level interactions and interaction terms on the individual level. The final model explains about 60% of the variance on the aggregate level and 30% on the individual level.     

Who captures whom? Regulatory misperceptions and the timing of cognitive capture

To explain cognitive capture, economic sociologists often examine the structure of relationships between regulators and market participants. This paper argues that the nature of regulators' misperception should be subject to analysis as well. Different types of misperceptions develop over timelines of varying lengths. Depending on the misperception, different sets of relationships and parties may therefore be the cause of regulators' capture. The paper illustrates this point with a case study of regulators' failure to detect pervasive market power in California's electricity markets between 1998 and 2001. Existing explanations focus on sellers' short-term attempts to distract regulators from widespread evidence of market power. Using data from three archives and in-depth interviews, I show that the regulators did not fall prey to such “information problems.” Instead, their misperception resulted from a more foundational “worldview problem.” This error affects regulators' basic conception of the marketplace and can be traced to earlier and more gradual forms of influence exerted by utilities that, ironically, would become the victims of market power.