Science and the media in South Africa: Reflecting a ‘dirty mirror’

Abstract

The public understanding of science is vital in any society, to counter pseudoscientific claims and quackery. The relationship between scientists and the media (the latter often the only channel through which scientific findings reach the public) was studied within a South African framework. An empirical survey was conducted by means of a comprehensive questionnaire sent to 740 South African scientists and researchers and 360 journalists. Because the media are important in the public understanding of science, the survey tried to establish the depth of and possible reasons for distrust between the two professions and what structures could be put in place to overcome this. This study found some significant differences in the views of scientists and journalists about the role of science in society, how it could be communicated to the public, and the reasons for this dichotomy. Finally, proposals to bridge the gap between scientists and the media are made: the media should give serious attention to raise the standards of science reporting by establishing science desks headed by properly trained science editors and well-trained science reporters. On the other hand, scientists should be trained to communicate better with the media and, therefore, the public.     

A Review of: “Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, (eds.). Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.”

Because of its dynamic nature, those confronting the al-Qaeda threat must follow its evolution very closely. As demonstrated here, this task is particularly challenging when counterterrorism is carried out under the aegis of international organizations. This article explores the threat identification function of the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee (also known as the 1267 Committee) charged with supervising the UN sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and its associates. Examination of the role of threat identification in the committee's work, and of the content of the threat analysis presented in the periodic reports of its subsidiary monitoring team, suggests the marginality of strategic threat assessment and underscores the constraints created by bureaucratic and political factors. The article also demonstrates the failure of the Committee and the monitoring team to thoroughly engage in central questions regarding al-Qaeda's nature, objectives, and organizational strategy.