Oil,the Suez canal,and sterling reserves: economic factors determining British decisionmaking during the 1967 Arab–Israeli crisis

This article assesses the importance of economic factors for the development of British Middle Eastern policy during the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis, based on newly declassified government documents. Policy shifted from threatening unilateral action against Nasser to multilateralism and neutraliry shortly before the June war. Economic considerations will be put in the context of anti-interventionist voices in the cabinet, in the defence establishment and within US policy. The article concludes that important reasons for the shift were economic, namely threats of an oil embargo, reserve withdrawals, and Suez Canal closure at a time of fiscal difficulties in Britain. In addition, an ideological shift in cabinet from ‘imperial hangover’ to anti-interventionism underlay the policy change.     

Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results

Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. However, attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961, 1994 and 1998.     

FBI analysis of terrorist incidents in the United States — 1982

Abstract

When analyzing terrorism in Germany, attention normally focuses on the Rote Armee Fraktion, better known as Baader‐Meinhof gang. Already in the early years of the RAF there existed different groups, such as the Movement 2nd June, which often rivaled and strongly critized the elitist avant‐gardism of Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, and Gudrun Ensslin. Today only a small fragment of the some 350 terrorist acts and 500 acts of sabotage (1985 statistics) can be attributed to the RAF. Germany's other terrorists, the Revolutionary Cells and autonomous/anti‐imperialist groups have long ago outdone the RAF and become a much graver threat to the internal security of the Federal Republic. Though similarities in rhetoric and operational approach exist between the RAF and these groups, the existing underlying differences are strong and until recently have prevented cooperation. The hunger strike campaign of the winter 1984/1985 appears to present a change in policies on behalf of the Cells.