Some technological implications for ascertaining the contents of contracts in web-based transactions

This paper points out some unexpected relationships between specific aspects of contract law and specific Internet-related technologies. The discussion is not about the interplay between “Law” and “Technology,” or the “Law” and the “Internet.” The aim is modest: to identify some theoretical chokepoints created by the technologies involved in web-based commerce and to point out the legal uncertainties persisting in this area. The analysis is confined to the process of contract formation, not to matters of substantive law. It is during this process that parties assume their contractual obligations and the contents of a contract crystallize.     

Policy Decentralization and the Endogenous Effects of State Traditions: Devolution of Water Management in Ghana and Senegal

Abstract

The widely held belief that decentralization of public services would reduce the fiscal burden of deeply indebted states led a large number of developing countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s to embark on devolution and public sector reform. Among the responsibilities that have generally been devolved are the provision and support of drinking water facilities. There is, however, a substantial cross-national difference in implementation records of public service devolution. This paper argues that state-building legacies, which shaped the capacity of local governments and the opportunity structure of local governments to cooperate with indigenous communities, explain this variation. This argument is analyzed in the context of devolution of water supply in Ghana and Senegal. The analysis shows that the weak capacity of local governments is compensated in Ghana, but not in Senegal, through co-optation of historically strong traditional authorities into local governance structures.     

The Netherlands

European Journal of Political Research -     

Strategic Consequences of Radical Islamic Neofundamentalism

Militarized Islamic neofundamentalism is a modern and essentially violent ideology. As an ideology, it cannot be killed, but instead must be supplanted. The strategic objective of defeating the ideology is distinct from, and sometimes in conflict with, the tactical objective of combating terrorists. Managing this tension requires the war on terror to be conceived in essentially political terms, which in turn requires a realignment of U.S. security policy.     

The Muslim Middle East: Is There a Democratic Option?

American counterterrorism strategy defines as “moderate” or “mainstream” any Muslim who does not support the jihadi extremists, which sets the bar very low and does not consider the question of how widespread such support actually might be. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is not the lunatic fringe of Sunni Islam—it is the fanatic core of Sunni Islam, and shares much of its ideology with other organized Islamic groups and, for that matter, much of the Muslim faithful. “Moderate” Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are moderate only in relative terms, are mostly antidemocratic, and are more correctly considered nonviolent enemies of the U.S. This being the case, a democratic opening in the Muslim Middle East is all too likely to bring to power profoundly antidemocratic groups that are virulently and possibly violently hostile to the U.S. A possible alternative strategy is one stressing good government, with gradual democratization as societies decompress.     

A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror

The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the Islamist terrorist threat is relatively undeterred by the U.S. military presence abroad, and U.S. forces abroad, particularly those deployed in Muslim countries, may do more to exacerbate than to diminish the threat. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading the terrorist network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations.     

Stumbling into the Future? The Indirect Approach and American Strategy

The United States has yet to reconcile its strategic culture to the realities of the post-9/11 era. In the absence of a consensus on grand strategy, America's military and civilian leadership is arguing that in a world of “persistent conflict,” America must exercise its power in increasingly indirect ways. This essay explores the current surge of interest in the so-called “indirect approach” and its possible relevance for the strategic environment of today and tomorrow. We briefly consider a strategic framework for an indirect approach, what true implementation would take, and the attendant risks of such a path. Pursuing a global indirect approach in the absence of such a framework could send America stumbling to the farthest corners of the globe only to harm her own strategic interests.