Deterrence by Presence to Effective Response: Japan's Shift Southward

Over the past fifteen years, a quiet strategic shift has occurred in Japan. During the cold war era, Japan's defense was oriented towards the Soviet threat north of Hokkaido. However, under the very real threat of North Korean aggression, the less tangible threat of terrorism, and the perceived need to participate more fully in international peacekeeping activities, Japan has changed the characteristics of its armed forces. Additionally, an increasingly self-confident China is testing Japan's resolve in the waters surrounding Japan, simultaneously speaking of cooperative development while laying claim to a swathe of Japanese territory and waters. An apparently ambivalent United States, in relative decline, watches these proceedings. Japan has reoriented its defense posture to face south, towards the East China Sea, trying to shape Chinese behavior and hedge against future Chinese adventurism. However, with a tangible recommitment of American attention to East Asia and a firm, public, American stand on behalf of Japan's territorial integrity, future conflict can be deterred.     

How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015

Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases, the People's Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lower-order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China's position as the Asian hegemon.     

Putting a Human and Historical Face on Intelligence Contracting

This history of intelligence contracting in the United States is in many ways the story of American intelligence itself. For all the current criticism of this “new post-9/11 industry,” intelligence contracting pre-existed the creation of formal intelligence bureaucracies and gradually developed from alliance-based intelligence sharing and ad-hoc individual agreements into the increasingly private and corporate companies of today. Most of the criticisms of the field are similarly rooted in history: over the ages, some have been legitimate and others less so. Ultimately, when viewed in context, however, intelligence contracting is not nearly as dark or nefarious as is typically portrayed, but rather has been and continues to be a pillar of American intelligence production.     

The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World

The decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed.     

The Rise of Policy Institutes in the United States, 1943-1971

In the period after World War II, an eclectic assortment of scholars, policymakers, and managers presided over the creation of academic centers for the study of war. This article examines the intellectual and administrative assumptions of many of these actors. Made up of academic scholars from the fields of political science, sociology, and economics, they advanced a vision based on what might be called “instrumentalist-positivist social science,” but in appeals to donors they employed basic scientific language.¹     

What Would Harvey Say?

Former Secretary of the Navy remembers his classmate from the University of Pennsylvania's International Relations program. Their subsequent careers intersected often in the years ahead—in Philadelphia, Washington, and beyond. John Lehman said Harvey “was an invaluable counsel on matters great and small, professional and personal.”     

Hussein bin Talal: Soldier-King

King Hussein had come to embody his country and bequeathed a much more robust state than the one he inherited, the author argues.