U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq: A Perspective on Year 5

President Bush's surge strategy intends to use the might of the U.S. military to establish secure conditions in Iraq under which the promise of political progress will be realized. The U.S. military used this approach in the past when the U.S. Fallujah Offensive of late 2004 established security for the Iraqi Election Cycle in 2005. But the promise of political progress for insurgents was not fulfilled in 2006 upon formation of the Maliki government, and they resorted to extreme levels of violence in response, killing 1,080 U.S. troops during the 12 months ending September 2007, more than in any other comparable period. In the second half of Year 5, from September 2007 through the fifth anniversary of the war on March 19, 2008, U.S. forces in cooperation with Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias helped improve security conditions once again. But unless the surge's promise of political progress is fulfilled, the patience of the insurgents and militias is likely to dissipate and violence will increase once again in Year 6.     

Rethinking the Battle of Ideas: How the United States Can Help Muslim Moderates

There is little disagreement in Washington that the United States is losing the so-called Battle of Ideas, and there is a surprising consensus on what needs to be done: “reach out” to Muslim moderates. Bolstering moderate voices in the Muslim world is indeed crucial to the fate of the War on Terror, but “reaching out” to them is no solution. In fact, it is the last thing Muslim moderates need, since it deepens their legitimacy problems. The West's criticism may do more to help Muslim moderates become a political force to be reckoned with than its love ever could. This “cruel to be kind” rhetorical strategy can, and should, be combined with open material support for Arab and Muslim civil society, but crucially without regard to political orientation. Such a policy has its drawbacks and it will be a difficult sell, but it is the only way to make progress in the Battle of Ideas.     

The Future of War and American Military Strategy

The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.     

The Twin Peaks of Pyongyang

The United States has been negotiating with North Korea in an effort to have it renounce its nuclear program for over a decade, since Washington negotiated an Agreed Framework in 1994. In this time, North Korea has only amassed more plutonium. The negotiations are hindered by mutual distrust and hostility, but it is doubtful whether any change in Washington's attitude toward the dprk would help solve the nuclear issue. It is the Kim regime that is the core problem. Until the regime is removed, there can be no durable peace in the region. This article suggests that with the prospect for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue remote, and since any attempt to remove the Kim regime militarily would entail huge costs, Washington might consider a third option: directly engaging the North Korean people.     

Unauthorised access to wireless local area networks: The limitations of the present Australian laws

Wireless local area networks (WLANs) have enjoyed a rapid increase in usage in recent years. WLANs serve to connect users to the Internet by means of radio or infrared frequencies. The rise in WLAN usage has however served to highlight some of the inadequacies of the present laws governing unauthorised access to WLANs. At present, the legislation serves to make unauthorised access, modification or impairment of electronic communications illegal. It is clear that the provisions prohibit the hacking of computer systems and denial of service attacks. However, it is unclear whether the legislation extends to additional forms of unauthorised access such as wardriving (using software to identify and map freely available WLAN) and joyriding (accessing a network with no further damage to the connection). The liability of Internet Service Providers and those engaged in unauthorised access in public places also remains unclear. Finally, the relationship of the offence of unauthorised access to the tort of trespass and the laws of copyright remain untested. The objective of this paper is to consider the measures necessary to increase the effectiveness of WLAN laws. The paper will begin by considering the nature of WLAN technology and the policy discourse to date. This will be followed by an examination of the present Australian law and an identification of areas of uncertainty. Finally, the paper will consider the measures required to enhance the certainty and effectiveness of the laws governing unauthorised access to WLAN.     

Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military Modernization

According to a recent RAND report, the United States will not be able to defend Taiwan from Chinese military aggression by 2020. However, this study, like many others, raises more questions than it answers about the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) current defense posture.¹ Is there a Chinese plan to claim Taiwan by force after 2020? In contrast to the conclusions of the RAND report, this article argues that China's strategic approach is not designed primarily for fighting a war over Taiwan, or over any other matter of critical interest to China, but to create a disposition of forces so favorable to Beijing that China will not need to fight a war. Rather than thinking of China's strategy as a blueprint for using military power to secure territory or vital resources, such as oil, it may be more appropriate to consider the possibility that Beijing's actions are directed at obviating the need to fight. Beijing may calculate that it can render its interests unassailable by constructing a network of friendly or dependent states by means of arms transfers and the like. The basis of such a strategy is the assumption that China's prospective enemies, finding themselves encircled or obstructed by powers aligned with Beijing, will be unable to envision a military campaign to deny China oil at an acceptable level of costs. They will, therefore, be deterred from threatening China, e.g. by interrupting its oil supplies. It is a mark of the efficacy of this broader deterrence strategy that American security analysts are already ruling out a successful defense of Taiwan in 2020. Similarly, the early stages of an effort to insulate China from an energy-related challenge are already visible.     

Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States?

Most interventions by outside forces to promote democracy in post-conflict states since WWII have failed. The most successful were in societies, such as Germany and Japan, featuring relatively high per capita GNP and diversified middle class economies. Among societies in general, prospects for democracy tend to diminish as per capita GNP decreases. The effects of conflict make democracy promotion considerably more difficult, particularly when poorer societies are plagued by weak institutions, corruption, religious extremism and ethnic, religious or factional animosities. Even if outsiders are able to control violence and actively promote democracy, success will depend on the underlying political culture and willingness of key political actors to play by democratic rules once the outsiders have gone. Hence, outsiders need to develop the best possible understanding of their prospects for success before committing to intervention, particularly when the resource demands are likely to be high.