Der Europ?ische Gerichtshof als Motor der Integration: Eine akteursbezogene Erkl?rung

For nearly five decades, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a decisively pro-European case law and has become the ??engine of integration??. Institutional explanations shed light on the Court??s room for manoevre. They have to be complemented by actor-centered explanations that shed light on the judges?? motives of action. The explanation offered by the following paper is unfolded in two steps. In the first one, the article describes idiosyncrasies of the European law discourse that already shaped the judges before they were appointed. The analysis of the idiosyncrasies corresponds to a scepticism towards the idea of national sovereignty, a belief in the necessity of creative and idealist, law-augmenting judges and a dominance of output-oriented legitimization strategies. In a second step, the article shows that in the sociological sense the ECJ judges constitute a group. While the individual judges share an understanding of the aims and functions of European law, the group develops its own identity and grants status to those who perform successful actions with respect to the common integration agenda. This explanation is more realistic than ??rational choice?? explanations which point to the direct and personal benefits that judges derive from their pro-European case law.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

What does “knock and announce” mean? An analysis of<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wilson v. Arkansas</Emphasis> and its progeny

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Arkansas (1994) that the common law “knock-and-announce” principle formed part of the “reasonableness” inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court’s opinion gave little guidance as to what would be unreasonable under these circumstances. Some critics expressed concern that this lack of guidance would lead to many variations among lower courts. Other observers discerned a signal that little should be deemed “unreasonable” in the context of “knock and announce.” These criticisms are analyzed through a review of lower court interpretations of Wilson.     

Perceived fairness of drug-testing policies: An application of Leventhal’s principles of procedural justice

Employees rate the fairness of organizational policies by applying principles of distributive and procedural justice. Using Leventhal’s (1980) Principles of Procedural Justice, the current study surveyed 279 upper-level college and graduate students to determine the impact each principle has on support for drugtesting policies. The results support the hypothesis that drug-testing programs that violate these principles are viewed as unfair.     

Author Index volume 35 (2002)

Authors Index

Author Index volume 35 (2002)     

Plasma,oral fluid and sweat wipe ecstasy concentrations in controlled and real life conditions

In a double-blind placebo controlled study on psychomotor skills important for car driving (Study 1), a 75 mg dose of +/- 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) was administered orally to 12 healthy volunteers who were known to be recreational MDMA-users. Toxicokinetic data were gathered by analysis of blood, urine, oral fluid and sweat wipes collected during the first 5h after administration. Resultant plasma concentrations varied from 21 to 295 ng/ml, with an average peak concentration of 178 ng/ml observed between 2 and 4h after administration. MDA concentrations never exceeded 20 ng/ml. Corresponding MDMA concentrations in oral fluid, as measured with a specific LC-MS/MS method (which required only 50 microl of oral fluid), generally exceeded those in plasma and peaked at an average concentration of 1215 ng/ml. A substantial intra- and inter-subject variability was observed with this matrix, and values ranged from 50 to 6982 ng/ml MDMA. Somewhat surprisingly, even 4-5h after ingestion, the MDMA levels in sweat only averaged 25 ng/wipe. In addition to this controlled study, data were collected from 19 MDMA-users who participated in a driving simulator study (Study 2), comparing sober non-drug conditions with MDMA-only and multiple drug use conditions. In this particular study, urine samples were used for general drug screening and oral fluid was collected as an alternative to blood sampling. Analysis of oral fluid samples by LC-MS/MS revealed an average MDMA/MDEA concentration of 1121 ng/ml in the MDMA-only condition, with large inter-subject variability. This was also the case in the multiple drug condition, where generally, significantly higher concentrations of MDMA, MDEA and/or amphetamine were detected in the oral fluid samples. Urine screening revealed the presence of combinations such as MDMA, MDEA, amph, cannabis, cocaine, LSD and psilocine in the multiple-drug condition.