Managing the People: Art Programs in the American Depression

How do “classical” big art institutions (museums, the ballet, the opera, symphony orchestras) react to phenomena of globalization such as migration flows, the “denationalization” of artistic movements, the enormous growth of the number of artists, the trend of a global cultural branding of cities, etc.? And which cultural policies do governments develop to interfere in the relationship between those art institutions and their changing environments? Those were the central questions I asked while doing research about the position of art institutions in society today. The research concentrated on a very diverse sample of big art institutions in Europe. The research begins with the insights of Actor Network Theory and the political philosophy of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt and leads to an ideal typical two-dimensional model to classify the possible strategies that such institutions and their responsible governments can use on the local, national and international level.     

Political Institutions and Conservation Outcomes: Wildlife Policy in Zambia

“Messy” democratic political institutions might generate ineffective conservation policy watered down by competing interest groups and rival political parties. A hardcore environmentalist may believe that a pro‐conservation dictatorship would be the type government best able to meet her goals. Such an environmental fantasy became reality in Zambia under President (1972‐1991) Kenneth Kaunda. But despite his dictatorial powers, he did not have much success in curbing the poaching epidemic that swept through Zambia in the 1970s and 80s. The structure of the one‐party state, together with a fall in the price of Zambia's principal export (copper) and a concomitant increase in the value of many wildlife products, created an environment that generated incentives for politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens to disregard Kaunda. This analysis challenges conventional wisdom about the politics of one‐party states. It shows that even in the case of one‐party government, the structure of political institutions remains critical to the extent of a dictator's control.     

Political Manipulation Or Feedback In English Local Authorities’ Standard Spending Assessments? The Case Of The Abolition Of The Inner London Education Authority

The focus of attention in this article is on the major shift in Education Standard Spending Assessments, and with it central grants, in favour of Inner London which first took place in 1990, and has persisted since then. This coincided both with the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority and the transfer of education responsibilities to the Inner London Boroughs, and the introduction of the poll tax. The objective of this article is to test whether this shift in favour of Inner London was due to political manipulation or, instead, was another example of the long-established technical characteristic of 'feedback' in spending needs assessments in the English local finance system. A test is devised which distinguishes between these two explanations and involves the use of an Inner London dummy variable. The results provide strong evidence of political manipulation. The implications of this finding are considered.     

The scope and limits of financial liberalisation in developing countries: A critical survey

This article reviews the growing literature on financial reform in developing countries. We draw both on the theoretical contributions outlining the case for and against liberalisation as well as on the experience of many developing countries with liberalisation. We argue that the existence of market failures in financial markets hampers the liberalisation process and indeed suggests that the simple liberalising strategy envisaged in much of the literature is inappropriate. We argue instead for an alternative strategy which integrates some aspects of liberalisation with the development of appropriate financial institutions designed to serve best the needs of the real economy.     

Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of Campaign Speech?

A new era has emerged in the ways in which candidates for state judicial office campaign. In the past, judicial elections were largely devoid of policy content, with candidates typically touting their judicial experience and other preparation for serving as a judge. Today, in many if not most states, such campaigns are relics of the past. Modern judicial campaigns have adopted many of the practices of candidates for other types of political office, including soliciting campaign contributions, using attack ads, and even making promises about how they will decide issues if elected to the bench. Not surprisingly, this new style of judicial campaigning has caused considerable consternation among observers of the courts, with many fearing that such activity will undermine the very legitimacy of legal institutions. Such fears, however, are grounded in practically no rigorous empirical evidence on the effects of campaign activity on public evaluations of judicial institutions. The purpose of this article is to investigate the effects of campaign activity on the perceived legitimacy of courts. Using survey data drawn from Kentucky, I use both post hoc and experimental methods to assess whether public perceptions of courts are influenced by various sorts of campaign activity. In general, my findings are that different types of campaign activity have quite different consequences. For instance, policy pronouncements by candidates do not undermine judicial legitimacy, whereas policy promises do. Throughout the analysis, I compare perceptions of courts and legislatures, and often find that courts are far less unique than many ordinarily assume. I conclude this article with a discussion of the implications of the findings for the contemporary debate over the use of elections to select judges to the high courts of many of the American states.