On the employment effect of noncompliance with the minimum wage law

A major result of the economic literature on minimum wage noncompliance is that a competitive employer who opts not to comply with the minimum wage law will employ less labor than he would have in the absence of a law. The reason for this is that noncompliance entails the risk of getting caught and punished, consequently raising the marginal cost of labor to the employer. An implicit assumption underlying this result is that noncompliance does not affect the free market wage rate facing the competitive employer. The present note shows that noncompliance will bring about a fall in the market wage rate and that if employers and workers are risk neutral, the market wage rate will fall in a way that leaves the marginal cost of labor intact. Consequently, the enactment of a minimum wage law, if not accompanied by sufficient enforcement to induce compliance, will have no effect on the level of employment.     

Transitions from AFDC to SSI before welfare reform

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs serve populations with similar characteristics. SSI serves adults and children with disabilities who are in low-income families, and AFDC serves low-income families with children. Because of that overlap, policy changes in one program can affect the other. In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which transformed AFDC into the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Many people have expected that implementing that welfare reform legislation would eventually increase SSI participation, for two reasons. First, TANF includes new work requirements and time limits that induce more AFDC/TANF recipients with disabilities to obtain SSI benefits. Second, the change in the funding mechanism--from open-ended funding on a matching basis for AFDC to cash assistance block grants for TANF--gives states a stronger incentive to shift welfare recipients to SSI. This article examines the interaction between the SSI and AFDC programs in the prereform period (1990 to 1996) and discusses the potential implications of welfare reform on that interaction. Using matched data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and Social Security Administration (SSA) records, our analysis focuses on how the interaction of those programs affects young women (aged 18 to 40) and children (aged 0 to 17). We find a very strong link between AFDC and SSI for young women and children. Significant portions of young female and child SSI beneficiaries in the 1990-1993 period were in AFDC families or had received AFDC in the past. In addition, a substantial share of young women and children who received AFDC during that period eventually entered SSI. Because the SSI program is now serving a much larger population of families with young women and children than in the past, SSA might need to develop policies to better serve that group. The findings also suggest that the prereform period is a poor baseline against which to measure the impact of TANF, primarily because of the instability in programs and policies.     

Whose Fault Is it Anyway? Political Orientation, Attributions of Responsibility, and Support for the War in Iraq

Political orientation has been shown to be a strong predictor of attitudes toward war. Specifically, political conservatism has been associated with increased support for war and with decreased attribution of responsibility for war to one’s own government. The present research aims to test whether the relationship between political orientation and support for the war in Iraq is mediated by attributions of government responsibility. In Study 1, survey data showed that the relationship between political orientation and support for the Iraq war was mediated by beliefs about the US government’s motivations for the war. Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of the proposed mediation model and extended the findings from beliefs about US government motivations to perceived threat from the pre-war Iraqi government. Study 3 used an experimental paradigm to manipulate perceived threat to show that such beliefs directly affected support for the war. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.