Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary

Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami.     

Mexico's Southern Flank: The “Third” U.S. Border

Mexico's crime-ridden southern frontier has become a veritable third U.S. border, as a constant flow of Central Americans and others cross into Mexico, often en route to the United States. As the number of unlawful migrants surges, their characteristics are changing: recent apprehensions include nationals of Caribbean, Middle Eastern, and Asian nations, and foreigners linked to terrorism are using Mexico as a thoroughfare to the United States. Mexico's immigration department is hindered by a number of factors in stanching this flow, and Mexican officials have only begun to publicly recognize the severity of the problem. Washington, too, must wake up to the security threat posed by Mexico's soft underbelly.     

North Korea: The Case for Strategic Entanglement

North Korea is a state shrouded in secrecy, yet it receives an enormous amount of media attention. Its reclusive nature makes analysis difficult and speculative. What is certain is that a dangerous stalemate regarding nuclear weapons has persisted for far too long and is an obstacle to any real change in the political system. History, culture, and ideology all rule the state's actions; it is therefore a mistake to assume North Korean negotiators can act with autonomy. A new and dynamic means to deal with this dilemma should be developed, for the past has demonstrated that threats and demands will not coerce Pyongyang into submitting, in fact, that approach will only exacerbate the problem. An effective means to move beyond the stalemate is needed.