Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents,Durable Authoritarianism,and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Drawing on recent critiques and advances in theories of the rentier state, this paper uses an in-depth case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to posit a new “supply and demand” approach to the study of external rents and authoritarian durability. The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly foreign aid, but also of the demands of a coalition encompassing groups with highly disparate economic policy preferences. The breadth of the Hashemite coalition requires that the regime dispense rent-fueled side payments to coalition members through constructing distributive institutions. Yet neither rent supply nor coalition demands are static. Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality.

Roles,trust and skills: A typology of patronage appointments

This article contributes to the study of the politics of patronage appointments by creating a typology of patronage roles based on the nature of trust between patrons and appointees and on the skills patrons seek in appointees. Our classification brings together the dispersed literature on patronage roles and can be applied to the study of modalities of patronage across and within countries. We offer preliminary evidence from our study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America suggesting that variations in patronage roles can be related to variations in the institutionalization of party systems and to the nature of the links between political actors and voters. Finally, we explore whether the categories identified in our empirical study can be found in other settings. We conclude that our typology can contribute to the study of the impact of modalities of patronage on the quality of public administration and on political governability.     

Validation of tool mark analysis of cut costal cartilage

This study was designed to establish the potential error rate associated with the generally accepted method of tool mark analysis of cut marks in costal cartilage. Three knives with different blade types were used to make experimental cut marks in costal cartilage of pigs. Each cut surface was cast, and each cast was examined by three analysts working independently. The presence of striations, regularity of striations, and presence of a primary and secondary striation pattern were recorded for each cast. The distance between each striation was measured. The results showed that striations were not consistently impressed on the cut surface by the blade's cutting edge. Also, blade type classification by the presence or absence of striations led to a 65% misclassification rate. Use of the classification tree and cross-validation methods and inclusion of the mean interstriation distance decreased the error rate to c. 50%.     

Governance is where you find it

The concept of governance is used frequently and in a variety of different ways. This article discusses Mark Bevir’s use of an interpretative approach to governance and its implications for understanding better how we govern. This approach has particular relevance to democratic forms of governance, and to the use of deliberative and direct forms of democracy.     

The Moral Superiority Effect: Self Versus Other Differences in Satisfaction with Being Overpaid

This paper focuses on how people think about their own and other's reactions to being overpaid. Two experiments investigate the discrepancy between people's own satisfaction and their perception of other's satisfaction with overpayment. The results of both experiments support our hypothesis that people think others are more satisfied with being overpaid than they are themselves. Our results are consistent with the idea that people think others are more influenced by egoism-based considerations whereas they themselves are more influenced by considerations of right and wrong. In other words, people show a moral superiority effect. In the general discussion, we argue why it is less likely to find moral superiority effects on people's reactions to being equally paid and underpaid, and we relate our findings to the literature of self-serving biases.     

Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation

The motivation for the Lindahl equilibrium is mostly a rather artificial price mechanism. Even though the analogy to a competitive market was emphasised by Lindahl himself, his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas behind his concept. In the present paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some simple equity axioms. These normative assumptions are the benefit principle on the one hand and the equal sacrifice principle (or, equivalently, a non-envy condition) as a postulate for distributional equity on the other. Fairness among agents with different preferences and incomes is taken into account by considering their marginal willingness to pay as shadow prices. In this way, the reason why the Lindahl solution can be perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation might become more understandable.