The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary on Ehud Sprinzak's The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right∗

Between 1968 and 1974 Italy was subjected to an unusually virulent campaign of right‐wing terrorism and subversion. An illustrative episode associated with this so‐called ‘strategy of tension’, which was characterized by the systematic use of covert ‘false flag’ operations, was the 17 May 1973 grenade attack outside Milan police headquarters that resulted in four dead and over 40 injured. Although the perpetrator, Gianfranco Bertoli, claimed to be an ‘individualist anarchist’ and had in fact established contacts with certain anarchist and leftist groups, subsequent judicial investigations revealed that he had been an informant and infiltrator for the Italian military intelligence service, that he had long maintained links with various anti‐communist and neo‐fascist organizations, and that he apparently received ‘cover’ and some type of logistical support prior to the attack from one or more ‘international secret services’. Although many aspects of the crime still remain murky, in all probability Bertoli was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of clandestine, quasi‐official intelligence apparatuses rather than a solitary anarchist engaging in violent ‘propaganda of the deed’.     

THE CRITICAL CLIMATE AGENDA

The world set a goal in the Paris Agreement: to keep global warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius of preindustrial levels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has explained why this is a valid goal. If global warming were to go higher than 1.5 degrees Celsius, this would jeopardize life on the planet with a potential multi-meter sea-level rise, the collapse of critical ecosystems, and the release of methane from thawing permafrost, possibly triggering runaway warming. Yet the world's current trajectory implies a catastrophic 2.7-degree- Celsius increase in global temperature.     

The CIA and congressional oversight: learning and forgetting lessons

Organizations both learn lessons and forget lessons. A lesson said to be learned by the CIA as a result of the negative reaction of congressional overseers to its interrogation program was the need to create opportunities to provide information and interact with them. The historical record shows that this was a lesson already learned. Why then the need to relearn it? It is suggested here that organizational forgetfulness may be triggered by the same factors which promote learning: perceived problems with organizational performance, opportunities to act, and people.