The Invisible Hand and the Wisdom of the Hive

Self-interest is required for survival and reproduction and lies at the foundation of economic theory. But the presence of social groups with functional internal structure is incompatible with unmitigated self-interest. This essay compares the control of self-interest in humans and honey bees, showing the reasons for different evolutionary outcomes. The less effective checks of self-interest in humans lead to familiar forms of social discord, and in our capitalistic democracy, negative economic and ecological consequences of growing scope. Change will require moderating some firmly held political beliefs.     

‘God Wanted Diversity’: Alawite Pluralist Ideals and their Integration into Syrian Society 1832–1973

The Alawites are often linked to the interests and fate of the al-Asad regime in Syria, yet a much broader context needs to be analysed to gain any meaningful impression of this community's politics. This article suggests that pluralism and diversity lie at the core of Alawite political preferences and what's more, according to Alawite perspectives, this is what God intended. Between 1832 and 1973 Alawites made gradual progress towards genuine integration into Syrian society, however, the confluence of two factors marked a turning point in this process: the mobilisation of Alawite ‘asabiyya by the al-Asad regime and a renewed perception of Sunni Muslim intolerance. Thereafter a different trajectory was set towards the current crisis in Syria. The final analysis suggests that the longstanding political aspirations of Alawites are not dissimilar to those demanded in anti- regime protests that began in Syria in early 2011.     

Electoral Violence in Africa Revisited

This article addresses the still unsettled question of the incidence of violent election periods in Africa. It uses two new datasets, which report episodes of social conflict in the region for 1990–2011, and elections worldwide from 1960 to 2010. When combined, these data suggest that onsets of electoral violence peak around major election days in Africa as a whole, but with wide national variability in the volume of new episodes. Depending on the time span and type of social conflict, from one-quarter to three-quarters of the elections for national leadership have been without incident. The article also investigates the timing of electoral violence and the extent to which there is an experience curve effect, whereby subsequent elections have fewer onsets of social conflict. The data indicate that two-thirds to three-quarters of elections are free of onsets of social conflict, but that the proportion does not change much with experience. Overall, there appear to be reasonable grounds for optimism about peaceful elections in many African countries.     

Editors' Note

Examining the relationship between regime type and defense effort provides evidence for reformulating theories of democratic peace. Consistent with liberal theories, regime type has substantively and statistically significant effects. In times of peace, democracies bear lower defense burdens than other states and keep proportionately fewer soldiers under arms. During times of war, however, democracies try harder and exert greater defense effort than non-democracies. Contrary to the results of some recent studies, all other things being equal, the arsenal of democracy appears to out-gun its opponents when it counts. Examining three components of democracy separately indicates that a largely overlooked factor, political competition, tends to drive these outcomes. Executive constraints are also associated with increased defense effort during war. But there is little evidence that wide participation or large winning coalitions have the predicted effects on defense effort. The results point to the flexible quality of defense effort in democracies, which is theoretically and empirically accounted for by the competitive political environment rather than institutional factors favored by existing theories.     

Predatory versus developmental rule in Africa

Political economy predicts that national leaders opt for economic development when institutions encourage them to extend their time horizons. By contrast, leaders turn predatory if they feel at risk. Leaders are most able to bear risk right upon taking office, but this can be offset by a perception of high volatility in office holding or by concern about catastrophic losses. Political institutions can therefore discourage predation by fostering recurrent, predictable replacement of leaders without harsh payback for ex-leaders who acted developmentally. Cataloguing all national leadership transitions in Africa since 1960, the article demonstrates that electoral cycles, term limits and the prospect of judgement before international tribunals have lately led to declines in the volatility of top office holding and in the risk of catastrophic loss to the occupants. These new institutions have yet to establish full credibility, but they show promise of altering African leaders' risk assessments to encourage more developmental rule.     

Diplomatic Rivalries and Cultural One-upmanship: New Zealand’s Long Quest to Become More Pacific than Australia

Abstract

New Zealand’s governmental and non-governmental agencies, academic commentators and media have long framed the country as uniquely and favourably positioned on cultural grounds to be a strategic diplomatic actor in the South Pacific. Justifications for the framing stem from two linked complexes: the history of New Zealand’s colonial and post-colonial involvement in a number of Polynesian territories in the Pacific; and the related history of relations between settlers and indigenes in New Zealand itself. These different strands of the argument have increasingly been brought together by the growth in numbers of New Zealand-born and domiciled Pacific Islanders. They, along with Maori, have been recruited into the diplomatic service and overtly contribute to the use of Polynesian encounter rituals in New Zealand’s diplomatic outreach. Such histories are used to justify New Zealand’s role in the Pacific in its relations with other external powers, especially in diplomatic jostling with Australia. The claims to special insight and cultural capital are subjected to critical scrutiny.     

Democracy,property rights and economic growth

What does the global surge in democracy and capitalism portend for economic growth? The shift toward popular government is predicted by some to accelerate growth, by others to retard it. Often left out of the equation is property rights as a factor distinct from democratic rule. Using recent data on 59 less developed and transitional countries, this article explores the relationship among institutional factors and growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. Democratic freedoms and property rights are associated with the dependent variable, suggesting that national income in poor countries stands to gain from recent efforts to implant these institutions.