May You Live to Be 150!

Daniel Callahan urges us to deliberate with a view to halting trends that might result in extending human lives to, say, 150 years. The socio-economic disruptions, he argues would be insupportable; changes affecting us all should not be left to personal choice or ceded to the juggernaut of untrammeled scientific inquiry and biomedical innovation. Goodman agrees that the ramifications of social change are often unpredictable, especially given the magnitude and accelerating pace of technological advance. But such changes are also polyvalent and will bring opportunities as well as challenges. Ageing, Callahan argues, is not a disease. So the desire to push back its boundaries is a medical aspiration, not a medical need. But that claim involves a category error. For although ageing is not a disease but a process, it is a process that makes us vulnerable to quite a variety of diseases and debilities. Morally, Goodman argues, it is wrong for “us” to seek to set limits to one another’s lives. Clearly most human beings would prefer any advances in life’s duration to proceed pari passu with preservation of the quality of life. But quality should not be made a fig leaf for sordid economic concerns. Human life is an intrinsic, not instrumental value. Humans can be creative long into old age, but persons should not be counted worthless just because they are no longer active, say, in the marketplace. Population is not pollution. But that equation raises its head ominously when Callahan grounds the mandate for collective deliberations about life extension on the analogy of laws restricting a supposed right to pollute. Citing prophetic visions of an age of reconciliation between the generations, Goodman sees community and communication—a mandate and an ethos of service—as critical to the effort to rise to the moral challenges that will present themselves as the trend toward life extension takes hold.

The changing nature of urban affirmative action programs: the search for race-neutral alternatives

In January, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court cast in doubt the legality of minority set-aside programs. The Court required government set-aside programs to meet a “strict-scrutiny” standard of review and required cities to first explore race-neutral means for increasing minority firm participation prior to utilizing any type of rigid quota system. This paper examines how four cities have reacted quite differently, with some cities continuing old practices, and others developing a mixture of new policies and implementation structures. It is argued that the Supreme Court's decision will have only a minor impact on minority contracting programs, with cities seeking to combine affirmative action contracting programs with those that stress economic development.     

The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansion on Migration

The expansion of Medicaid to low‐income nondisabled adults is a key component of the Affordable Care Act's strategy to increase health insurance coverage, but many states have chosen not to take up the expansion. As a result, for many low‐income adults, there has been stark variation across states in access to Medicaid since the expansions took effect in 2014. This study investigates whether individuals migrate in order to gain access to these benefits. Using an empirical model in the spirit of a difference‐in‐differences, this study finds that migration from non‐expansion states to expansion states did not increase in 2014 relative to migration in the reverse direction. The estimates are sufficiently precise to rule out a migration effect that would meaningfully affect the number of enrollees in expansion states, which suggests that Medicaid expansion decisions do not impose a meaningful fiscal externality on other states.     

Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods

This paper treats interest groups – peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers – asthe unit of account for representativevoting. Each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand, at the margin, the effort-benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits.

Under reasonable assumptions, a uniqueequilibrium is assured and itscharacteristics are quite intuitive. Inparticular, the marginal political benefit(from consumers) of the last unit of outputmust equal the marginal political cost(from taxpayers). Alternatively, the rateat which the politician can transformtaxpayer income into consumer surplus mustequal the ratio of their political prices. The result will be optimal only on the rareoccasion when the effort-benefit ratios ofthe two groups are equal.

Since political goals are themselves ``public goods'' for thetwo interest groups,they face all the normal free riderproblems. Moreover, even small differencesin the effort-benefit ratios of the twogroups lead to large welfare losses.

How bad can things get? Each group has anincentive to try to overcome free-riderproblems and divert resources from privatesector activities to politics. And anyincrease in political effort is alwaysrewarded. However, (1) the marginal returnis always higher for the group with thesmaller effort-benefit ratio; (2) thedifferential return between the two groupsgrows the further we stray from optimality;and (3) both groups face diminishingreturns. These incentives may act asnatural checks on political outcomes –placing some limit on the amount of wasteand inefficiency democracy is likely toproduce.

The influence of a producer (of the publicgood) group that collects a rent increasesthe likelihood that public goods will beoverproduced. In fact, it is conceivableto have a good with no value to consumersproduced, solely because of the influenceof producers. Comparative static analysisreveal that the political system willrespond to changes in market conditions ina way similar to economic markets. Themagnitude of these shifts differs fromeconomic markets, however. For goods thatare being overproduced, the politicalmarketplace overresponds to changes indemand and underresponds to changes incosts. The converse is true for goods thatare being underproduced.