Systems analysis and welfare reform: A case study of the family assistance plan

This paper discusses the impact that systems analysis has had on the welfare reform legislation of the last four years. After a general discussion of welfare reform's objectives and constraints, and their particular application to the family assistance proposal, the state of the art of systems analysis as related to welfare problems is described. The successes and failures of the cost-effectiveness approach in developing and modifying the proposal are outlined in analyses of major issues, including the proposal's impact on state welfare programs, work incentives, the integration of cash assistance with assistance in kind, and alternatives for welfare administration.Presented at the 41st Meeting of the Operations Research Society of America on April 27, 1972.The author participated in the development of the family assistance legislation while an employee of the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Office of the Secretary).The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Joint Economic Committee.     

Reviews

R. W. Davies, The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia 1. The Soviet Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, xxi+491 pp., twenty tables. £20.00.

The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia 2. The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929–1930. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980. x + 216 pp., nine tables. £20.00.

Zdeně'k Mlynár, Night Frost in Prague. The End of Humane Socialism. London: C. Hurst & Co., 1980. 300 pp. £9.50.

Alistair McAuley, Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards and Inequality. Hemel Hempstead: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1979 and Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979. xix + 389pp. £15.00.

Nicolas Spulber, Organizational Alternatives in Soviet‐type Economies. London: C.U.P., 1979, x + 290 pp, index. £15.00.

J. H. Moore, Growth with Self‐Management: Yugoslav Industrialization 1952–1975. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. xvi + 334 pp. $17.95.

Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace. The Sino‐Soviet‐American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd., New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980. xv + 384 pp. £15.

Boris Komarov (pseud.), The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union. Foreword by Marshall I. Goldman. White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe,* 1980. x+150pp. $15.00.

George Katkov, The Kornilov Affair: Kerensky and the Break‐up of the Russian Army. London and New York: Longman, 1980. xiv + 210 pp. £4.95 paper.     

An economic appraisal of urban housing assistance: rental supplments versus public housing

Abstract. The benefits and costs of rental supplements versus public housing are analysed in this study. The role of social assistance and public housing in improving housing standards of low income households is assessed. Housing standards for households with incomes below 3, 000 and the dollar return to private property owners renting to social assistance recipients are studied as two measures of effectiveness of the alternatives. Measures of housing standards for low income households are reviewed. It was concluded that, for welfare and non-welfare households, low income is the critical factor determining the existence of low quality housing. Data on target clientele reached by current housing programs are not available, so it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of such programs in improving housing standards of low income households. Various public and private costs critical to the assessment of housing assistance are discussed. In conclusion, it is pointed out that a simple benefit/cost analysis is inadequate for deciding on public housing versus rental supplements. Several additional studies are required, including: decisions on minimum levels of housing standards, comparison of other housing assistance progrm, and costs of all housing and nonhousing programs. Sommaire. Cette étude porte sur les coêts et les bénéfices d'une politique de subvention des loyers par opposition à une politique de logement public. Les auteurs évaluent le rôle que jouent l'assistance sociale et le logement public dans l'amélioration de l'habitation des économiquement faibles. Ils étudient la qualité de l'habitation des familles ayant un revenu inférieur à 3, 000 et la rentabilité des propriétés privées louées am assistés sociaux en tant que critères d'évaluation. Ils passent en revue les normes de qualité du logement des économiquement faibles. Ils concluent que c'est le faible revenu qui est la cause déterminante de la mauvaise qualité du logement peu importe que les familles dépendent ou non du bien-être social. Il n'existe pas de données concernant la clientèle profitant, à l'heure actuelle, des programmes de logement et il est donc difficile de déterminer la contribution de ces programmes à l'amélioration du logement des économiquement faibles. Les auteurs discutent des différents coûts, publics et privés, ui entrent dans l'évaluation d'une subvention au logement. Ils concluent en faisant remarquer qu'une simple analyse coûts/bénéfices est insuffisante pour choisir entre le logement public et le loyer subventionné. D'autres études seront donc nécessaires, plus particulièrement sur les normes minimales de logement, sur la comparaison àétablir avec d'autres programmes d'assistance au logement, et sur les coûts de tous les programmes de logement en comparaison avec les coûts des autres programmes.     

The pits and the core: Simple collective decision problems with concave preferences

This essay extends the theory of simple collective decision problems to spatial games in which (contrary to the traditional assumption) each agent's preferences are concave, in the sense that the alternatives that the agent does not prefer to any particular reference alternative together constitute a convex set. Such concave preferences might characterize decision problems in which, say, a site must be selected for some obnoxious facility, such as a prison, garbage dump, or facility for managing hazardous materials. The results indicate that, under these conditions, the (weak -)core can be structurally unstable, changing discontinuously with apparently minor perturbations of the decision problem. The main theorem identifies a curious property of the core when the set of feasible alternatives is compact and convex and each agent's preferences are strictly concave. Namely, a point in the feasible set's interior can belong to the core only if there is no feasible alternative that makes every member of any winning coalition strictly worse off. In this sense, an interior point belongs to the core only if it lies in the pits.A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the West Coast Conference on Small Groups Research, Stanford University, 17 April 1985, and the Experimental Social Choice Workshop, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, 20–21 June 1985. This material is based on work supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (Grants SES 83-12123 and SES 84-10094), the Real Estate Center and Department of Decision Sciences of The Wharton School, and the Research Fund of the University of Pennsylvania.