Do intergovernmental transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina

The effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom intergovernmental transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-à-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary transfers. For large/rich provinces, the evidence is less conclusive.     

Shells and Bones: A Forensic Medicine Study of the Association of Terrestrial Snail Allopeas micra with Buried Human Remains in Brazil

Little is known regarding the scavenger fauna associated with buried human corpses, particularly in clandestine burials. We report the presence of 20 shells of the terrestrial snail Allopeas micra, within hollow bones of human remains buried for 5 years, during the process of collecting DNA material. The fact that a large number of shells of A. micra had been found in the corpse and in the crime scene supports the assumption that there was no attempt to remove the corpse from the area where the crime occurred. Despite this, our observations cannot be used to estimate the postmortem interval because there is no precise knowledge about the development of this species. This is the first record of a terrestrial snail associated with a human corpse and its role in this forensic medicine case.     

Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies

Provisions for a parliamentary investiture vote have become increasingly common in parliamentary democracies. This article shows that investiture provisions were largely introduced when new constitutions were written or old ones fundamentally redesigned. It also shows that the constitutions that endowed executives with strong legislative agenda powers also endowed parliaments with strong mechanisms to select the executive. It is argued that constitution makers’ decisions can be seen in principal–agent terms: strong investiture rules constitute an ex ante mechanism of parliamentary control – that is, a mechanism to minimise adverse selection and reduce the risk of agency loss by parliament. The findings have two broad implications: from a constitutional point of view, parliamentary systems do not rely exclusively on ex post control mechanisms such as the no confidence vote to minimise agency loss; parliamentarism, at least today and as much as presidentialism, is the product of conscious constitutional design and not evolutionary adaptation.     

Portugal

European Journal of Political Research -