Excepted substances: a comparison of Federal and state laws.

A state law has placed an obligation on the criminal investigation laboratories to screen and quantitate all preparations, both pharmaceutical and illicit, that fall under the provisions of "Excepted Substances." Without complete screens on these preparations, there is room for erroneous indictments as well as possible acquittals on technicalities.     

Terminating federal research and development programs

The barriers to terminating federal research and development vary with the type of program (manpower resource creation, basic or applied research, hardware development) and the functional sector in which it is lodged (defense or civilian). Each has a public/private constituency of sponsors and performers. Some constituencies are much more potent than others. Hence, to kill an R&D program, one must weaken the constituency behind it. Useful strategies for would-be terminators include decremental funding and the amalgamation of competing R&D programs within the same agency.     

China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia

While its economic dynamism stimulates continued growth in Asia, China's increasing demand for energy is creating intense competition, particularly with Japan, over international sources of supply. Domestic fields have generally been disappointing, as have efforts to pipe gas from Central Asia and Russia to the east coast. Consequently, China is not only paying greater attention to potential petroleum resources in the East and South China Seas, but also considering the vulnerability of its sea-lanes to the Middle East and beyond. Its need to diversify has promoted closer relations with Central Asia, the Middle East, and the oil producing countries of Africa and Latin America, but the jury is out on whether China's concerns for secure energy supply will lead to international cooperation against terrorism or fuel the already heated competition for oil and gas. As China continues to assure its future energy security in Asia and many areas of the world, sustained bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to reconcile disputes and avoid conflict will become more important than ever.     

Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-Building in Europe

Current approaches examining the effect of institutions on policy processes have difficulty in explaining the results of the legislative process of codecision between the European Parliament and Council within the European Union. The formal Treaty changes that gave rise to codecision have, in turn, given rise to a plethora of informal institutions, in a process that is difficult to understand using dominant modes of analysis. This article provides a framework for analyzing the relationship between formal and informal institutions, showing how the two may be recursively related. Formal institutional change at a particular moment in time may give rise to informal institutions, which may, in turn, affect the negotiation of future formal institutions. The article applies this framework to the codecision process, showing how the codecision procedure has led to the creation of informal institutions and modes of decision-making, which have affected subsequent Treaty negotiations. Through strategic use of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, the European Parliament has been successful in advancing its interests over time and increasing its role in the legislative process.     

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement.     

Umbau des Sozialstaates? Österreich und Deutschland im Vergleich

In comparative analysis of welfare states, there is a consensus that mature welfare state systems have been confronted, for some considerable time, with substantial pressure towards re-structuring and that, as a result, they actually have undertaken several and varied modifications. This articles aims at exploring and analysing these developments in Austria and Germany from a comparative point of view. The analysis concentrates on two vital fields of social policy: old-age insurance and unemployment insurance. Especially in respect of the development of social policy and regarding important characteristics of the two welfare state systems, both countries traditionally show a large degree of resemblance to each other. Many similarities remained to exist during the phase of growing pressures on the welfare state, whereas at the same time it is evident that differences between the two countries increased. The respective actual developments will be interpreted in the light of corresponding theories of comparative welfare state research and classified as gradual and structural changes.     

Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers?

Administrative data from North Carolina are used to explore the extent to which that state's relatively sophisticated school‐based accountability system has exacerbated the challenges that schools serving low‐performing students face in retaining and attracting high‐quality teachers. Most clear are the adverse effects on retention rates, and hence on teacher turnover, in such schools. Less clear is the extent to which that higher turnover has translated into a decline in the average qualifications of the teachers in the low‐performing schools. Other states with more primitive accountability systems can expect even greater adverse effects on teacher turnover in low‐performing schools. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Regulatory budgeting: A bad idea whose time has come?

Advocates of regulatory relief propose a budget that would annually cap regulatory costs. But emulating fiscal budgeting would be much more difficult than they envision. An arbitrary macrobudgetary constraint would have to be selected, and the potential scope of the regulatory budget would be vast. The process of regulatory budgeting would be very-time consuming, and could increase micromanagement by the Congress. Estimating regulatory costs would be challenging, and ignoring regulatory benefits would be unfair and inefficient. A preferable alternative to regulatory budgeting would be to expand the Government Performance and Results Act to include cost-effectiveness reviews for regulations.