Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real-world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases, two-sided incomplete information actually incentivizes honest behavior and facilitates credible signaling. Because uncertain senders do not know whether a particular action will be interpreted as cooperative, they have little incentive to misrepresent, and instead honestly pursue their true goals. Thus, where cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty is “offsetting,” such that credible signals allow actors to quickly and accurately update their beliefs. We illustrate this logic through a case study of the Sino–Soviet split, and highlight the model's implications for contemporary U.S.–China relations.     

Planfeststellung und Plangenehmigung im Wasserhaushaltsrecht

Natur und Recht - Nachdem in NuR (2022, Heft 2, S. 77ff.) die Reichweite des wasserhaushaltsrechtlichen Planfeststellungsvorbehalts sowie Fragen der Verfahrenswahl erörtert wurden, behandeln...     

Planfeststellung und Plangenehmigung im Wasserhaushaltsrecht

Natur und Recht - Planfeststellung und Plangenehmigung sind etablierte Instrumente der Vorhabenzulassung und für den Gewässerausbau bereits seit langem auch im Wasserhaushaltsrecht...     

An Anthropological Examination of the Types of Skeletal Fractures Resulting from Fatal High (˃3 m) Free Falls,

Fatal falls from heights (?3 m) often result in blunt force trauma (BFT) to the skeleton. The fracture patterns that result from this BFT mechanism are well understood in forensic anthropology and forensic pathology; however, details of the specific types of fractures that result remain poorly documented. The aim of this study was to provide a detailed examination of the types of fractures that may result from fatal high falls. Fractures were recorded from 95 full‐body postmortem computed tomography scans of individuals known to have died from a high fall. Trauma was then analyzed taking into account the extrinsic and intrinsic variables known to influence a fall using multiple logistic regression. A total of 339 types of fractures were classified, of which 16 were significantly associated with this BFT mechanism. Classified fracture types will augment anthropological interpretations of the circumstances of death from BFT in cases of suspected high falls.     

Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.     

Arguing Against the Expressive Function of Punishment: Is the Standard Account that Insufficient?

Law and Philosophy - This paper critically appraises the arguments that have been offered for what can be called ‘the expressive function of punishment’. According to this view, what...