Francis Fukuyama and the Origins of Political Order and the State: A Historical Critique

This essay examines the model of state development put forward by Francis Fukuyama in his book, The Origins of Political Order. It argues that the evolutionary model used by Fukuyama experiences problems when it comes to dealing with specific historical examples. Its emphasis on the Qin state as the “first modern state” places an excessive emphasis on coercion and violence as the basis of the state. It attempts to relegate Rome to being equivalent to a chiefdom to fit it into his model whereas in reality Rome evolved differently to China and relied much more on cooperation and networks. England after 1688 provides another example of how Fukuyama's model is deficient. On this basis the paper argues that a universal evolutionary model is insufficient to explain political development and it is more appropriate to begin analysis with real political societies.     

Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting

Almost all legislators are subordinate to party leadership within their assemblies. Institutional factors shape whether, and to what degree, legislators are also subject to pressure from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders. This article presents a set of hypotheses on the nature of competing pressures driven by formal political institutions and tests the hypotheses against a new dataset of legislative votes from across 19 different countries. Voting unity is lower where legislators are elected under rules that provide for intraparty competition than where party lists are closed, marginally lower in federal than unitary systems, and the effects on party unity of being in government differ in parliamentary versus presidential systems. In the former, governing parties are more unified than the opposition, win more, and suffer fewer losses due to disunity. In systems with elected presidents, governing parties experience no such boosts in floor unity, and their legislative losses are more apt to result from cross-voting.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

Virginia's Revenue Forecasting Process and Models

In Virginia, major differences between revenue forecasts and actual revenue collections raised questions from legislators about the adequacy of the state's econometric forecasting models and the forecasting process itself. Consequently, Virginia's process and models were examined by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC), a legislative watchdog agency. The review found most of the differences could be attributed to declining economic factors and not poor forecasting. However, a surprisingly large component of the forecast was based on undocumented judgmental inputs that required greater oversight. Other states in similar circumstances may wish to evaluate their own forecasting process and econometric models using the JLARC approach.     

Warriors in the “new world order”

He writes regularly on matters of strategy. His publications include The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower;and Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties.