Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO INDUSTRY AND URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This paper examines the use of financial incentives to industry to promote urban economic development. It describes the types of incentives offered and sumniarizes the research on the effects of these incentives on firm location. It then examines and contrasts the costs and benefits of incentives to various political jurisaictions—municipality, state and nation. Finally, it aadresses the question of whether incentives, as currently designed, can solve urban unemployment and income problems. It considers the types and intrastate locational preferences of inciustries typically sttracted by incentives and concludes that current incentives may be of limitea effectiveness in promoting urban development. The discussion is particularly relevant in light of continued federal emphasis on introduction of enterprise zones as the major tool of urban economic development policy.