Risk assessment in offenders with intellectual disability: a comparison across three levels of security

In mainstream offender samples, several risk assessments have been evaluated for predictive validity. This study extends this work to male offenders with intellectual disabilities. Participants from high-, medium-, and low-security settings, as well as community settings, were compared on a range of risk assessments. The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, HCR-20-Historical Scale, the Risk Matrix 2000-C (combined risk), and the Emotional Problems Scales-Internalising discriminated between groups, with participants from high security having higher scores than those in medium security, who had higher scores than those in the community. The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, all HCR-20 scales, the Short Dynamic Risk Scale, and the Emotional Problems Scales (Internalising and Externalising) showed significant areas under the curve for the prediction of violence. The Static-99 showed a significant area under the curve for the prediction of sexual incidents. The discussion reviews the value of these various scales to intellectual disability services.     

A century (plus) of parenthood: Changes in living with children, 1880–1990

This paper summarizes the broad foundations of the changing nature of parenthood by examining trends in coresidence with children under age 15. Our study uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) to provide a portrait of demographic parenthood in the US over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In describing changes in parenthood over the past 110 years, we distinguish between those living with own children and those living with other children. We focus in particular on changes in gender patterns of coresidential parenthood and changes in the likelihood that divorced men and women live with children. We also examine the impact of the baby boom on parenting. Our findings support a recasting of ongoing discussions of the parental roles of American men and women by shifting the historical demographic focus from biological transitions to the social aspects of parenting.     

Covid-19 and UK Universities

Universities UK (UUK) has suggested that there may be very significant losses to higher education as a consequence of Covid-19. However, losses are likely to be substantially lower than the potential losses estimated by UUK. But the magnitude of losses is very uncertain. The UUK’s proposal to restrict undergraduate enrolment per university to stop institutions poaching students is not in the interests of the most highly regarded universities, or that of students. Some rationalisation of the sector should be the price of further government support. Now is also the time to reconsider how university research is funded.     

Can budget ambiguity crowd out intrinsic motivation? Longitudinal evidence from federal executive departments

While some scholars have assessed how various features of organizational structure shape intrinsic motivation, the role of budgets and, in particular, programme funding has been overlooked. To address this gap in the literature, we examine how programme funding decisions impact employee motivation. Referencing previous work, we hypothesize that funding choices that emphasize some programmes over others signal clearer organizational goals for employees, thereby increasing intrinsic motivation. In contrast, departments that do not use their budgets to signal clear goals can run the risk of reducing their employees’ intrinsic motivation. We empirically investigate this hypothesis within the context of the US Federal executive departments, constructing a longitudinal dataset (2010–15) from multiple sources. Findings support our hypothesis. Employees in departments that more evenly fund their programmes report lower levels of intrinsic motivation.     

Single-party government,Prime Minister psychology,and the diversionary use of force: theory and evidence from the British case

ABSTRACT

This paper develops expectations about the likelihood of diversionary conflict initiation by parliamentary democracies with single-party majoritarian (SPM) governments. While most of the literature on diversion and governmental arrangement claims that SPMs have little incentive and/or limited capacity to execute diversionary gambits, we contend that the structural and environmental impetuses for diversion in such states are in fact largely indeterminate. We posit that the psychological attributes of prime ministers under SPM – in particular, their level of distrust – is the most important predictor of how they view structural and environmental constraints, and thus of whether they will militarily divert from poor economic conditions. Distrustful prime ministers are predisposed to the use of force, will dwell on the costs of economic problems, and fear that co-partisan MPs (especially in the cabinet) have designs on their office. Thus, despite having a legislative majority, these leaders will choose diversionary conflict over economic policy fixes. We conduct a partial test of this hypothesis in the British case from 1945 to 2007, and our analyses provide robust support.     

Continuity and Change

正It became commonplace during former U.S. President Donald Trump's tenure to hear the Communist Party of China(CPC) maligned in Cold War-style rhetoric, with the emphasis on "communist" and Marxist as the dirtiest of words, which were then stretched into alarmist fantasies alleging China's efforts to impose a communist vision globally.     

Measuring the “personal vote” of members of Congress

This paper uses a pooled time series/cross sectional research design to measure the “personal vote” of three groups of members of Congress. The personal vote is defined here as that part of a candidate's vote share that is unique to him or her. It is measured using a legislator-specific intercept for each legislator in an equation predicting vote share. The other variables in the equation account for the effects of the election year environment and the tenure of the representative. Three cohorts of representatives are analyzed: 1) those whose careers ended before 1966, 2) those whose careers began after 1965, and 3) those whose careers began before 1966 but ended after. The mean legislator-specific intercept is nearly twice as large for the first group as for the second; it is 29 percentage points larger for the first than the third. A second stage regression explains these intercepts using legislator characteristics, party affiliation, region of origin, and number of terms served. The term effects increase at an increasing rate as tenure increases for all those whose careers end after 1966. Personal vote accumulates nearly twice as fast for those first elected after 1965 as for those first elected before 1966.