Disarmament,with special reference to Asia

On February 20 M. V. dc Korostovetz read a paper on Soviet Russia and her Southern Neighbours. The subject was divided into four parts: (a) The general trend of Russia's foreign policy, which, whether Imperial or Bolshevik, has differed in method rather than aim; (b) the States from Turkey to China, lying to the south of the Soviet block, with special attention to Chinese Turkestan; (c) the Ukrainian attitude to Communism; and (d) an outline of the new canals planned to make the Volga the chief waterway of Russia at the expense of the Don, and, with the refortification of the Straits, to turn the Black Sea into a mare clausum.     

Afghanistan from 2012-2014: Is A Successful Transition Possible?

The issue is not whether a successful transition in Afghanistan is possible,it is rather whether some form of meaningful transition is probable-a very different thing.The answer is a modest form of strategic success is still possible,but that it is too soon to know whether it is probable.The Afghan government,the U.S.and its allies,and aid donors have not made enough collective progress to assign a clear level of probability.Equally important,it is too soon to know what level of forces they will maintain in Afghanistan through the end of 2014 and beyond,what levels of military and civil aid they will provide,and what level of success Afghanistan can achieve moving forward.     

Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign Policy Failure

States respond to failure in different ways. In light of the phenomenon of revisionist states, it is particularly important to understand why some revisionist states revert to status quo pursuits in the face of policy failure, while others pursue revisionism even in the face of external developments that we might expect would push them toward moderation. Domestic structure, domestic politics, and elite ideology each contribute to an explanation of how revisionist states respond to policy failure, but none of these variables alone tells the full story. As is illustrated through case studies of Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi foreign policy in the 1980s, domestic structure plays the launching role in the analysis of how a revisionist state will behave. Regime type structures the incentives facing leaders and determines whether domestic politics or elite ideology is determinative in predicting a revisionist state's reactions to failure.     

The catch‐all party thesis and the Austrian social democrats

This article examines Kirchheimer's catch‐all party thesis systematically, using the example of the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ). First, five central elements of the Kirchheimer catch‐all party are identified and possibilities for empirical research are explored. Then the empirical evidence on these five dimensions is analysed. As Kirchheimer has expected, the SPÖ's ‘ideological baggage’ has been drastically reduced, its top leadership groups and its electoral leader in particular have been further strengthened, the working‐class clientele has been de‐emphasised, and the party's function in the political system has been substantially reduced. Concerning the SPÖ's link to interest groups, however, Kirchheimer's thesis is only valid when looking at the most recent period. In view of the cumulative effect of the changes in the direction of a catch‐all party the SPÖ of the 1990s can definitely be classified as a catch‐all party.