Federal Reimbursement for Mandates on State and Local Governments

One of the remedies sought by state and local officials for the growing burden of federal mandates is a mandate reimbursement law. A major purpose of mandate reimbursement is to deter Congress from imposing excessive costs on state and local governments by making it fully accountable for its actions. The paper begins by extending the economic theory of grants to mandates and reimbursed mandates. It goes on to assess the benefits and costs of mandate reimbursement, and to distinguish mandates that should be reimbursed, should a reimbursement program prove desirable, from those that should not. Then, using the economic theory of grants and mandates, the paper compares reimbursed mandates with two alternatives for accomplishing the same objective, compensating grants and procedural rules. It concludes that the latter are more promising than mandate reimbursement.     

Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility

This paper reviews China's recent efforts to enact a competitionpolicy (antitrust) law. We focus on three issues: (1) What isthe substance of the proposed law, and how does it differ fromexisting antitrust law in other countries, (2) How will thelaw be implemented or enforced, and how will those who mustimplement this law interpret their mandate, and (3) What willbe the likely effects of this law given China's unique historyand cultural heritage. We emphasize China's economic, legaland regulatory contexts in which an antitrust law may be enforced.Our central focus is the problem of establishing a substantiveand procedural legal framework that is incentive-compatiblewith economic efficiency and growth. The draft law could beimproved, both to increase its clarity and to make its enforcementmore consistent with the goal of achieving improvements in economicefficiency. Nevertheless, there is much merit in the draft,especially its strong focus on reducing anticompetitive practicesof state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other government bodies.However, our major difficulty with the new law is that, in theabsence of a tradition of reliance on the rule of law, Chineseand foreign enterprises will find it very difficult to relyon the antitrust statute or the actions of the courts in Chinaas a basis for predicting the antitrust liability that mightresult from various business practices. Therefore, the principalvector by which antitrust law (or indeed any law) affects economicbehavior is absent from the Chinese scene. Unless the bureaucracythat enforces the new antitrust law actively pursues a policyof consistent enforcement based on written guidelines, staredecisis, or other sources of predictability, the substance ofthe statute itself will have little significance. That outcomewould represent a significant loss for the economic welfareof the Chinese people.     

DOES ECONOMICS PROVIDE A RELIABLE GUIDE TO REGULATING COMMODITY BUNDLING BY FIRMS? A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE

This article surveys the voluminous economic literature on commoditybundling. While bundling has been widely studied, the vast majorityof the literature has focused on theoretical treatments of bundlingthat demonstrate a wide range of reasons why firms might engagein bundling. These papers generally contain restrictive assumptions,including assumptions regarding the existence of monopoly insome markets, and the nature of rivalry in others. The modelscontained in these papers also generally suppress the more obviousand ubiquitous reasons firms may use bundling. Moreover, thesemodels have not been subject to robustness checks, nor havetheir assumptions been tested empirically. This review of theeconomic literature generally confirms the US Solicitor General'sview in 3M v. LePage's regarding the underdeveloped state ofthe economics literature and its position that the US SupremeCourt should defer promulgation of antitrust standards for bundling.While the literature has demonstrated the possibility that bundlingcan generate anticompetitive harm, it does not provide a reliableway to gauge whether the potential for harm would outweigh anydemonstrable benefits from the practice. As a result, the widespreadapplication of the antitrust laws to bundling by firms can generatesignificant error costs by erroneously condemning or deterringefficient business practices. In the future, economists shouldseek to expand their understanding of both the anticompetitiveand procompetitive reasons firms engage in bundling. This willentail studying the reasons why bundling is adopted by firmswithout market power, relaxing the assumption of monopoly intheoretical models, and generating testable hypotheses and thedata to test them.     

Fertility and migration in the heart of the industrial revolution.

This study examines demographic growth and change in Tilleur in the valley of Meuse in Belgium during 1807-80 during the process of industrialization and urbanization. The proportion of immigrants (foreigners and Flemings) increased from 15% in 1807 to 65% in 1856. After 1856, population and industrial growth stabilized. During 1856-66 the proportion of natives stabilized, and the proportion of Flemings increased. It is argued that in Tilleur there were two phases: a foundation phase of industrial and population growth and a phase of maturation with decreased non-native population and greater similarity between groups. Immigrants contributed to the birth rate in greater proportions than their proportion in the population of Tilleur. During 1847-66 native population increased annually from 2.4% to 3.8%. Migrants' annual increases were diminished by the effects of mortality but expanded by the influence of in-migration. During 1857-66 the proportion of foreigners declined and marked the transition to a new phase. During 1830-66 the sex ratio grew from 93 to 119. During the Industrial Revolution in Tilleur, women shifted from outnumbering to undernumbering men. The iron and coal in the region attracted men. The sex ratio among the Flemish was 214 in 1866. In 1830 the proportion of fertile women was higher among immigrants and declined thereafter. Age at marriage rose for natives and declined for immigrants. The native population structure by sex, age, and marriage did not favor the birth rate. During 1866-80 the birth rate of foreign immigrants and rural natives declined, the birth rate of natives doubled, and the gap between these two groups narrowed. The changes among immigrants during the foundation phase led to fertility decline in the maturation phase. Marriage and migration interactions linked the industrial revolution with the demographic transition.