Sensitivity of various study technics in blood stains

Quadratic pieces of fleece measuring 16 mm2 were soaked with 10 different blood-samples in the dilution steps of 1:1, 1:10, 1:100, 1:1000, respectively, and were tested in blood group typing and identification tests of forensic serology. The above spezified dilutions correspond with 5 microliters, 0.5 microliter, 0.05 microliter and 0.005 microliter of blood, respectively. The detection limit of the microspectrometric test for blood was the dilution 1:10, of the porphyrine test a dilution above 1:100, whereas the preliminary test for blood (peroxidase) succeeded always up to a dilution of 1:1000 and the species determination by the radial immunodiffusion test in agar gels succeeded in most cases op to a dilution of 1:1000. The detection limit of the anti-human globulin inhibition test was between the dilution steps 1:10 and 1:100 when non-titrated and undiluted anti-human globulin serum was used. Gc- and ABO-grouping were possible up to a dilution of 1:100 and were thus the most sensitive grouping systems. Phenotyping of the enzyme-systems and the Gm/Km-system usually required stains with considerably higher blood concentrations i.e. stains of undiluted blood.     

Federal Reimbursement for Mandates on State and Local Governments

One of the remedies sought by state and local officials for the growing burden of federal mandates is a mandate reimbursement law. A major purpose of mandate reimbursement is to deter Congress from imposing excessive costs on state and local governments by making it fully accountable for its actions. The paper begins by extending the economic theory of grants to mandates and reimbursed mandates. It goes on to assess the benefits and costs of mandate reimbursement, and to distinguish mandates that should be reimbursed, should a reimbursement program prove desirable, from those that should not. Then, using the economic theory of grants and mandates, the paper compares reimbursed mandates with two alternatives for accomplishing the same objective, compensating grants and procedural rules. It concludes that the latter are more promising than mandate reimbursement.     

A Prospect Theory Analysis of California's Initiatives in Implementation of its Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEV) Mandate1

In 1990, the state of California passed the pioneering mandate on zero emission vehicles (ZEV). This technology‐forcing regulation is aimed at improvement of air quality and protection of public health from the adverse effects of air pollutants from automobiles. Facing severe opposition from the auto industry, the mandate has been revised a number of times, most recently in 2003, whereby the requirement for ZEVs have been made to align with the pace of technology development. Review of strategies used in implementation of the mandate has revealed greater emphasis on the economic incentives for rather than on environmental merits of ZEVs. Using prospect theory as the framework for analysis, the reasons have been explored. The findings of the study help us to understand how decisions are made with respect with to deviations from a mental anchor point and through the process of evaluation of losses and gains.     

DOES ECONOMICS PROVIDE A RELIABLE GUIDE TO REGULATING COMMODITY BUNDLING BY FIRMS? A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE

This article surveys the voluminous economic literature on commoditybundling. While bundling has been widely studied, the vast majorityof the literature has focused on theoretical treatments of bundlingthat demonstrate a wide range of reasons why firms might engagein bundling. These papers generally contain restrictive assumptions,including assumptions regarding the existence of monopoly insome markets, and the nature of rivalry in others. The modelscontained in these papers also generally suppress the more obviousand ubiquitous reasons firms may use bundling. Moreover, thesemodels have not been subject to robustness checks, nor havetheir assumptions been tested empirically. This review of theeconomic literature generally confirms the US Solicitor General'sview in 3M v. LePage's regarding the underdeveloped state ofthe economics literature and its position that the US SupremeCourt should defer promulgation of antitrust standards for bundling.While the literature has demonstrated the possibility that bundlingcan generate anticompetitive harm, it does not provide a reliableway to gauge whether the potential for harm would outweigh anydemonstrable benefits from the practice. As a result, the widespreadapplication of the antitrust laws to bundling by firms can generatesignificant error costs by erroneously condemning or deterringefficient business practices. In the future, economists shouldseek to expand their understanding of both the anticompetitiveand procompetitive reasons firms engage in bundling. This willentail studying the reasons why bundling is adopted by firmswithout market power, relaxing the assumption of monopoly intheoretical models, and generating testable hypotheses and thedata to test them.