Determinants of the university technology transfer policy-mix: a cross-national analysis of gap-funding instruments

University–industry technology transfer (TT) has become increasingly institutionalized and is supported by numerous reforms and initiatives at the national, regional and university levels. Most countries have implemented a policy mix involving a range of instruments to support the commercialization of research. Still, there is no systematic evidence indicating why the mix of policy instruments differs between countries. This study offers a novel cross-national investigation of the policy mix emphasizing the level of centralization and decentralization of policy instruments. We map and analyze two specific types of public instruments aimed at addressing the so-called funding gap in TT: proof of concept programs (POCs) and university-oriented seed funds (USFs). Based on a survey across 21 European countries, we find that such instruments are widely used but are organized differently depending on the level of implementation of TT practices in the country and the specific type of instrument considered. More precisely, we find a U-shaped relationship between the use of centralized gap-funding instruments and the country’s implementation of TT practices. Moreover, the type of gap-funding instrument (POC or USF) moderates this relationship. We discuss the implications of our findings and suggest that the policy mix of gap-funding instruments evolve with the maturity of the national TT infrastructure.     

Innovative regulations,incomplete contracts and ownership structure in the water utilities

Using an incomplete contract framework, we analyse new forms of regulation and private participation in public services. This paper explains contractual efficiency in the absence of financially guaranteed investments in public private partnerships. The example of a number of African countries underlines how a series of national, normative law reforms can give rise to innovations in approaches to regulation. This new hybrid form of regulation, inspired by a French regulation approach combining commission regulation and franchise bidding, could be more effective than previous approaches to regulation, in the sense of being more stable and more closely aligned with stakeholder expectations. This approach to regulation would appear to be more efficient economically, while integrating the objectives of solidarity tariffs and social water access connections. Based on these analyses, our results show (1) the impact on the robustness of new lease contracts on financing constraints, and (2) the advantages of Asset Owner Companies that reconcile explicit commitments and special purposes. We demonstrate that this achieves optimum efficiency by encouraging parties to determine jointly the optimal level of costs and investment. In addition, the mechanism fosters discussion about the possibility of institutionalizing Asset Owner Companies by predetermining the distribution of risk in lease contracts.     

Corruption and hold-up: the role of intermediaries

Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a firm in exchange for a license may still choose not to grant the firm that license (hold-up). This paper develops a model to study the role that intermediaries play in preventing hold-up. There are two types of firms, good firms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful firms that are not. Without intermediaries only good firms enter the market, and harmful firms do not enter because of hold-up. Intermediaries are legally permitted to help firms reduce their navigation costs of obtaining licenses. Thus, intermediaries increase entry of good firms. However, by utilizing the legal aspects of their transaction with good firms as leverage against the bureaucrat, intermediaries can prevent hold-up among harmful firms. Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and harmful firms and their welfare costs are ambiguous. Data obtained from occurrences of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are broadly consistent with our model.     

Procompetitive dual pricing

We analyze the procompetitive effects of dual pricing, that is, input market price discrimination. An upstream firm has an incentive to maintain competition downstream which is realized by selling at an advantageous price to an inefficient downstream firm when discrimination is possible while it would exit under uniform pricing. We augment the exit issue into existing frameworks of Katz (Am Econ Rev 77:154–167, 1987), DeGraba (Am Econ Rev 80:1246–1253, 1990), and Yoshida (Am Econ Rev 90:240–246, 2000) which allows us to show that price discrimination in intermediary goods markets tends to have positive effects on allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency, respectively. In contrast, a discrimination ban tends to facilitate exit of relatively inefficient firms, thereby strengthening downstream market concentration.     

Optimal liability for optimistic tortfeasors

As Alicke and Govorun (The self in social judgment, Psychology Press, New York, 2005, p. 85) observed, “most people are average, but few people believe it.” Optimism and other forms of inflated perception of the self lead parties to exercise suboptimal precautions when undertaking risky activities and often undermine the incentive effects of tort rules. In this paper, we show that the presence of optimism undermines several critical assumptions, upon which law and economics scholars have relied when modeling the incentive effects of tort law. We construct a model representing the incentives of “optimistic” tortfeasors and victims, and consider mechanisms for mitigating the effects of biased decision-making. We show that in the presence of optimism, comparative negligence rules are preferable to contributory negligence rules (i.e., the traditional equivalence between contributory and comparative negligence does not hold). Further, we discover the surprising conclusion that the most effective way to correct optimism may often simply be to “forgive” it, shielding optimistic individuals from liability, rather than holding them liable for the harms they cause.     

Innovation strategies of firms: What strategies and why?

This paper analyzes various innovation strategies of firms. Using five waves of the Community Innovation Survey in Sweden, we have traced the innovative behavior of firms over a 10-year period, i.e. between 2002 and 2012. We distinguish between sixteen innovation strategies, which compose of Schumpeterian four types of innovations (process, product, marketing, and organizational) plus various combinations of these four types. First, we find that firms are not homogenous in choosing innovation strategies, instead, they have a wide range of preferences when it comes to innovation strategy and some of the innovation strategies are “commonly” used among firms. Second, using Transition Probability Matrix, we found that firms also persist to have such a diverse innovation strategy preferences. Finally, using Multinomial Logit model, we explained the determinant of each and every innovation strategies, while we gave special attention to the commonly used innovation strategies among firms.     

Entrepreneurship ecosystems: an agent-based simulation approach

Knowledge acquisition and development of capabilities constitutes a key perspective in studies regarding the formation of new ventures. When examining entrepreneurship ecosystems, we find that the composition of a region influences the new knowledge acquired by the venture. The main aim of this study is to examine the influence of the new venture, the entrepreneur’s social capital, and the firm performance on the new venture’s knowledge acquisition activities. In particular, the study examines how the institutional context of a region influences new ventures’ knowledge acquisition actions during its growth, and in turn the level of sustained entrepreneurial activity within the region. The paper focuses on the formation of alliances by new ventures, one particular form of knowledge acquisition process that has been established as critical to new venture success in the high technology sector. The mechanisms for acquiring and transforming knowledge have the greatest impact on new venture formation, and in this context, the concepts of strategic knowledge arbitrage and strategic knowledge serendipity (SKARSE?) are validated through an agent-based simulation model. The main results focus on the effects of interactions between entrepreneurs and institutions in the process of new venture formation from a knowledge creation, dissemination, and absorption perspective.     

Workers’ risk underestimation and occupational health and safety regulation

The standard treatment of occupational risk in the labour market is conducted in terms of the theory of compensating wage differentials, the basic characteristic of which is that workers can fully estimate actual occupational risks. However, research in cognitive psychology, and recent advances in economic psychology, suggest that individuals consistently underestimate risks associated with accidents. In this paper, we discuss the case when the workers systematically underestimate job risks. After presenting the standard treatment of occupational risks, and of health and safety at work regulation, we then proceed to incorporate the idea of job risk underestimation. The paper discusses the types and impact of regulation on health and safety effort in a simple framework in which workers’ beliefs concerning accident risks also play a role. The paper shows that a particular type of regulatory intervention is necessary for the risk underestimating workers not to suffer a welfare loss.