Irrtum über die Voraussetzungen eines lebensgefährdenden Waffengebrauchs

Irrt ein Exekutivbeamter bei der Ausübung eines lebengef?hrdenden Waffengebrauchs darüber, dass ein wahrgenommenes Tatgeschehen in rechtlicher Hinsicht das – den Rechtfertigungsgrund des § 7 Z 3 WaffGG konstituierende – Deliktsmerkmal der konkreten Gemeingefahr (§ 176 Abs 1 StGB) verwirklicht, so liegt ein Irrtum über den sozialen Bedeutungsgehalt eines normativen Rechtfertigungsmerkmals vor, der nach § 8 StGB als sogenannter Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum und nicht als Rechtsirrtum (§ 9 StGB) zu beurteilen ist.     

Vorschläge zur Errichtung einer nationalen Menschenrechtsinstitution in Österreich

Österreich hat im Hinblick auf seinen nationalen Grund- und Menschenrechtsschutz durch die 1920 geschaffene Zentralinstanz des Verfassungsgerichtshofs lange Zeit eine Vorreiterposition in Europa belegt. Inzwischen wird jedoch immer deutlicher, dass zur Erfüllung völkerrechtlicher Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen sowie eines umfassenden Grundrechtsschutzes auf nationaler Ebene – im Sinne der Trias "respect, protect, fulfill" – die nachprüfende gerichtliche Kontrolle allein unzureichend ist. Die Schaffung einer unabhängigen und pluralistischen nationalen Institution würde dem Prozess einer kontinuierlichen Verbesserung der normativen und faktischen Menschenrechtssituation am Besten zum Ziel gereichen. Das umfangreiche Mandat einer solchen Menschenrechtsinstitution soll neben der Beratungs- und Berichtsfunktion gegenüber Regierung, Gesetzgebung und anderen staatlichen Organen insbesondere eine breite Kontrollbefugnis betreffend die Maßnahmen von Sicherheitsexekutive, Justizwache und Militär umfassen. Mediatives Einschreiten sowie die Kooperation mit internationalen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen komplettieren gemeinsam mit menschenrechtlicher Bildungs- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Forschung und Dokumentation die Hauptaufgaben der Institution. Seit der Weltmenschenrechtskonferenz 1993 in Wien besteht an der besonderen Bedeutung derartiger Einrichtungen kein Zweifel mehr; durch stetige Vorstöße internationaler Gremien, wie des Europarates und letztlich der Europäischen Union, erfährt die diesbezügliche Diskussion jetzt zusätzlichen Antrieb. Neben dem generellen, weltweiten Trend zur Errichtung nationaler Menschenrechtsinstitutionen stellen besonders die Entscheidung der EU, die in Wien ansässige Beobachtungsstelle für Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit (EUMC) ab März 2007 in eine Europäische Grundrechteagentur umzuwandeln, sowie Österreichs kurz bevorstehende Ratifizierung des Fakultativprotokolls zur UNO-Folterkonvention (OPCAT) unser Land vor die bedeutsame Aufgabe, endlich mit den zahlreichen europäischen Staaten gleichzuziehen, deren nicht-gerichtlicher Menschenrechtsschutz schon längst einer an den "Pariser Prinzipien 1993" orientierten, finanziell sowie organisatorisch unabhängigen Institution obliegt.     

Validation of powder X-ray diffraction following EN ISO/IEC 17025

Powder X-ray diffraction (PXRD) is used widely in forensic science laboratories with the main focus of qualitative phase identification. Little is found in literature referring to the topic of validation of PXRD in the field of forensic sciences. According to EN ISO/IEC 17025, the method has to be tested for several parameters. Trueness, specificity, and selectivity of PXRD were tested using certified reference materials or a combination thereof. All three tested parameters showed the secure performance of the method. Sample preparation errors were simulated to evaluate the robustness of the method. These errors were either easily detected by the operator or nonsignificant for phase identification. In case of the detection limit, a statistical evaluation of the signal-to-noise ratio showed that a peak criterion of three sigma is inadequate and recommendations for a more realistic peak criterion are given. Finally, the results of an international proficiency test showed the secure performance of PXRD.     

Shaping the Scope of Conflict in Scotland’s Fracking Debate: Conflict Management and the Narrative Policy Framework

This study applies a narrative lens to policy actors’ discursive strategies in the Scottish debate over fracking. Based on a sample of 226 newspaper articles (2011–2017) and drawing on key elements of the narrative policy framework (NPF), the research examines how policy coalitions have characterized their supporters, their opponents, and the main regulator (Scottish government). It also explores how actors have sought to expand or contain the scope of conflict to favor their policy objectives. Empirically, only the government strives for conflict containment, whereas both pro‐ and anti‐fracking groups prioritize conflict expansion through characterization contests and the diffusion and concentration of the costs/risks and benefits of fracking. In theoretical terms, the study proposes that Sarah Pralle’s conflict management model, which emphasizes symmetrical strategies of conflict expansion by both coalitions, is a potential tool to revise extant NPF expectations about the different narrative strategies of winning and losing coalitions. Moreover, the fact that policy actors mostly employ negatively rather than positively framed characters in their narratives may be a valid expectation for similar policy conflicts, particularly under conditions of regulatory uncertainty.     

Age structure and political violence: a re-assessment of the “youth bulge” hypothesis

A popular hypothesis in international studies states that a “youth bulge”––an age pyramid dominated by large cohorts between 15 and 29 years of age––increases the risk of political violence. However, empirical evidence on this link remains inconclusive to date. In this article, we systematically assess the youth effect using new data from 183 countries between 1996 and 2015. We find that within countries, a decrease in the youth ratio is generally associated with a decrease in the number of violent deaths from terrorism or other internal conflicts, and vice versa. This is also confirmed in out-of-sample predictions. However, the association is not evident in all constellations and sensitive to modeling issues. In particular, large cohorts of young males can become a disruptive power in countries that increase enrollment in post-primary education. Although this is usually followed by fertility decline, youth bulges often remain at record levels for quite some time due to high birth rates in the past. Strong labor markets can in general suppress the detrimental consequences of youth bulges. However, the combination of growing youth cohorts and educational expansion often leads to increased political violence even in the presence of low youth unemployment.     

The European Union in global environmental governance: Leadership in the making?

For well over a decade, the European Union (EU) has proclaimed its leadership role in global environmental governance (GEG). In this article, we examine both the nature of its leadership and the underlying conditions for ‘actorness’ upon which leadership must depend. The EU’s record in the global conferences as well as its influence on the reform of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are also investigated. We argue that the EU has frequently sought to shape international environmental negotiations and promote sustainable development as an organising principle of global governance. Despite its inadequate status at the UN and internal problems, it has had a significant effect on the global agenda. However, due to persistent diplomatic opposition from other coalitions, its real, directly visible influence has been more modest. For genuine directional leadership, which goes beyond the defence of self-interest, the Union will have to make internal policy coherence a greater priority. Moreover, apart from relying solely on its weighty presence in the international system or its potential capabilities, the EU needs to achieve a high level of credibility in order to enhance its powers of persuasion.

Mehr Zuwanderer,mehr Fremdenangst? Ein Überblick über den Forschungsstand und ein Erklärungsversuch aktueller Entwicklungen in Deutschland

The share of residents with foreign roots in Germany will rise considerably in the next years. A crucial societal question will certainly be whether natives will get used to the increasing level of ethnic diversity or whether anti-immigrant threat perceptions will rise. There is an obvious empirical paradox in the context of this question: On the one hand, high immigration usually coincides with more skeptical views towards immigration and greater success for right-wing political parties. On the other hand, these reactions are often over-represented in regions where the actual share of migrants is rather low. This paper presents an overview of theories and evidence on this apparent contradiction. A crucial factor which can at least partially reconcile these ambivalent findings is the geographic level of analysis: If the national share of migrants increases, media coverage of the topic is greater and fears among the population accordingly rise in most cases. On the level of regions, however, effects of contact and habituation are strongest, such that people living in high-immigrant regions tend to perceive immigration in a more positive way. On the level of city districts, the relationship seemingly turns negative again. Here, the more tolerant citizens live in residential areas with a low to moderate share of migrants, while natives living in districts with many foreigners tend to move away or vote for far-right parties, as the success of the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) in the 2016 state elections suggests. A number of conclusions can be drawn with regard to current developments in Germany.     

Predicting Competitive‐Unethical Negotiating Behavior and Its Consequences

This study examines the relationships between negotiators' attitudes toward competitive and unethical tactics, their actual use of those tactics, and their subsequent perceptions of performance and reputation in two‐party, e‐mail‐based negotiations. The results indicate several predictors of competitive‐unethical behavior, including a negotiator's attitude toward competitive‐unethical tactics, early use of competitive‐unethical tactics, and the behavior of a negotiating counterpart. Furthermore, it was the perceived honesty of one's counterpart rather than the actual use of competitive‐unethical behaviors that was associated with a negotiator's perceptions of the collective or joint outcome. The implications of these findings are discussed, along with suggestions for future research.