The dialogue of civilizations: Philosophical basis,current state and prospects

Since the end of the Cold War, the dialogue of civilizations has become one of the keywords in the global discourse on issues of world order and peace. Traditional enemy stereotypes along the ideological lines of the earlier East-West conflict have disappeared while new confrontational schemes are becoming visible under the slogan of a supposed clash of civilizations. The nature of dialogue consists in the ability to see oneself from the perspective of the other. The human being's consciousness – self-reflection – is only possible if the subject is aware of the other, i.e. of that which is not the self, that from which it can distinguish itself. Semantically, this is the essence of the Latin word definitio. Applied to the level of civilization, this entails that full understanding and development of any given civilization can only be achieved if the respective civilizational community not only takes note of, but positively interacts with other civilizations on the basis of (normative) equality. Thus, the dialogue of civilizations is the fundamental requirement for defining each civilization's identity and for reaching its maturity and universal relevance. The common values underlying all civilizations – making possible genuine civilizational progress – are those of tolerance and mutual respect. Acceptance and realization of those values is the necessary, though not the only condition for the adequate self-comprehension and identity of a civilization. In this regard, an analogy can be drawn between (a) the normative equality of civilizations on the socio-cultural level and (b) the concept of the sovereign equality of states on the political level. One of the most serious threats to international peace and stability, i.e. to the realization of the basic goals of the United Nations Organization, is the persistence – or even creation in certain cases – of enemy stereotypes along civilizational lines. Over the centuries, the demonization or vilification of another civilization (particularly in regard to religious identity) has often been a prelude to armed conflict and has served to create a pretext for – or to legitimize – the violent pursuit of mainly economic interests. At the beginning of the third millennium, the world should not repeat the mistakes of an earlier era. No civilization should try to establish hegemony over the other. The claim to civilizational superiority has too often been a recipe for confrontation, even armed conflict.     

Consensual Coalitions? Coalition Formation in Norwegian Municipalities

While widely applied to political coalitions in national assemblies and cabinets, theories of coalition formation have seldom been tested at the local level of government. This article presents a model of coalition formation in connection with mayoral elections in Norwegian local councils and tests it on the basis of the first systematic collection of data on the election of mayors from a large number of municipalities. It finds small significant effects on the probability that oversized coalitions will be formed. Contrary to "common" knowledge, the size of a municipality has a positive influence on the conflictual climate, and thus on the size of the coalitions formed, which implies that the probability that an oversized coalition will form is higher in a large than in a small municipality. It also finds that the possibility that an oversized coalition will form increases if one party controls a majority of the councilors on its own, and if the majority is non-socialistically controlled. The assumption of a strong norm for reaching consensus-based decisions, reinforced by the design of the local political institutions, is supported.     

Transcultural comparisons of self-image in German and United States adolescents

Based on the Offer Selfimage Questionnaire (OSIQ), the selfimage of German and United States adolescents was compared. The German study was based on OSIQ protocols from 365 adolescents in West Berlin while the American sample comprised adolescents drawn from seven cities in the United States. With respect to three scales, United States adolescents report better adjustment than do the German adolescents. These scales were Mastery of the External World, Vocational and Educational Goals, and Superior Adjustment. In general, these two Western societies share more similarities than differences in the selfimages of their adolescents.Received M.D. and Ph.D in Psychology from the University of Hamburg, Germany. Research interests are high-risk studies, child psychiatric epidemiology, and adolescence.Received M.D. from the University of Chicago. Major interests are concepts of mental health and the developmental psychology of adolescence.Received J. D. from the University of Chicago School of Law; received Ph.D. in Human Development from the University of Chicago. Research interests are adolescence and delinquency.Received Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Chicago. Major interests are psychotherapy research and adolescence.     

Collective and individual economic judgments and voting in West Germany, 1961–1984

Abstract: : This article attempts to provide individual-level support to findings of longitudinal macro-level studies of the relation between economic variables and electoral outcomes in the Federal Republic. The theoretical framework is one of incumbency-oriented vs. policy-oriented political responses to collective vs. individual economic judgments (Kiewiet, 1983). The data base consists of 25 surveys from 1961 through 1984. Empirical analysis comprises three steps: First, the relation between economic judgments and partisan sympathies is analyzed, since it appears likely that part of the covariations between voting and such judgments is spurious due to a common dependence upon partisan orientations. Second, the impact of both kinds of economic judgments upon voting over time is investigated with and without controls for partisan affiliation. Finally, the impact over time of macropolitical and macroeconomic variables on individual political response patterns to economic judgments is estimated at the longitudinal macro-level. The analysis demonstrates that collective economic judgments are generally a more potent predictor of electoral choice than individual economic judgments, and that there is clear empirical evidence both for the incumbency-oriented and the policy-oriented hypothesis linking such judgments to the vote.     

Regionalism and Crisis Prevention in (Western) Europe and (Eastern) Asia: A Systematic Comparison

While the globalization of risks is commonly recognized, a corresponding global pattern of risk management has not arisen. For a while after 1989 the vision of a global community of states appeared to be coming true. Long-standing conflicts were settled, and the UN Security Council for the first time acted with consent and commitment in the area of crisis reaction. However, this short-lived phase of global conflict management was soon troubled, beginning with a cascade of secessionist disputes and ending abruptly on 9/11. Ironically, today's global crisis management seems to be more complicated and less promising than that of the Cold War with its comparably primitive bipolar structure. Some threats, such as arms races, nuclear proliferation, enemy images and Alliance-building, have returned. Frozen conflicts have been re-heated because of spreading ethno-political strife. New lines of confrontation have also emerged from transnational constellations. Nations and states are under pressure to cope with new risks at a time when both their competence and capability to manage societal change and adjust to globalization are under duress.1 ¹?My thanks for editorial advice go to my assistant Heather Gilmartin. View all notes While the responsibility2 ²?Nye, J.S., “U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, no. 4/2003, p. 65. View all notes of states to carry out crisis management in a turbulent environment is increasing, their operational capability is being challenged, from both top-down and bottom-up. Most states in the northern hemisphere feel sufficiently prepared to prevent conflicts between themselves and other states, but they are less well prepared for armed conflicts other than among states—so-called asymmetric wars. Where nation-state-based responses are insufficient and global responses out of reach because of disagreement among big powers, it is the regional level, which looks most promising for tackling these new challenges. But even if regional patterns function well, crucial questions remain. Might smaller states become the objects or victims of power politics in a region if it is dominated by champions? Would regional arrangements foster global fragmentation? How can the success of regional conflict resolution be transferred to the national level in cases of transnational risks, and is there anything that states can learn from each other in organizing regional security and state-to-state cooperation? Finally, should tools and strategies that have proven successful in one region be applied to others? This analysis compares state-based regionalism in (Western) Europe and (East) Asia. It accepts the premise that states can learn from each other, but argues that attempts at direct model transfer should be avoided.     

Democracy Beyond Secrecy: Assessing the Promises and Pitfalls of Collective Voting

This paper assesses collective voting as a specific mode of democratic decision‐making and compares it to secret voting. Under collective voting, voters gather in one place and decide by the show of hands. We theorise two potential advantages and two disadvantages of collective voting so defined. We then draw on original survey data from one of the largest polities practising collective voting, the citizen assembly of the Swiss canton of Glarus. We find that both the promises and pitfalls of non‐secret voting are exaggerated. Non‐secret voting’s suspected pitfalls – social pressure and abstention – do not generally materialise in our sample, although for women they do appear to be relevant to some extent. However, the promises of collective voting – enabling cue‐taking and discursive bridging and bonding – are equally realised to a limited extent only.     

Authority and Representation

The act of `setting the law' enjoysa central position in Kelsen's theory of authority.His analysis of this act criticizes, amongst others,the assumption of natural-law doctrines that norms areobjective when they duplicate a content given directlyto cognition and independently of the act whereby thenorm is enacted. Correctly, Kelsen attacks the conceptof representation underlying this assumption as anexample of metaphysical dualism and a copy theory ofknowledge. Does, then, an alternative understanding ofauthority require scrapping representation from atheory of positive law? Or does it requireinterpreting representation differently? Following thesecond path, this paper reconstructs the act ofsetting the law in terms of the critical concept ofrepresentation developed by Ernst Cassirer andsuggests how, thus reconstructed, the structure ofthis act can account for the law's authority and itscontingency.

     

Impact of Early Adolescent Externalizing Problem Behaviors on Identity Development in Middle to Late Adolescence: A Prospective 7-Year Longitudinal Study

Adolescents at-risk for problem behaviors can have more difficulties in developing a firm sense of personal identity. Hence the purpose of this prospective longitudinal study was to scrutinize how externalizing problems in early adolescence impact identity development in middle to late adolescence. Participants were 443 (43.12 % female) Dutch adolescents. Teachers rated their externalizing problem behaviors when participants were 11 or 12 years old and their identity formation was studied during five consecutive years (from 14 to 18 years of age). The sample was divided into four groups: boys and girls with a high versus a low-risk for externalizing problem behaviors. Participants completed a self-report measure of identity commitment, in-depth exploration, and reconsideration of commitment. Multi-group Latent Growth Curve and profile stability analyses were used to evaluate identity development across adolescence. Findings indicated that high-risk boys and girls reported a less structured identity, with lower levels of commitment and higher levels of reconsideration of commitment. Since externalizing problems behaviors and lack of a coherent sense of identity might reinforce each other, early intervention for high-risk adolescents might foster positive youth development.