Global Governance through Private Organizations

Governance at international and global levels is not only provided through states and markets but also through a variety of private organizations. The business world is well represented through this kind of organization and contributes to global governance through self-regulation across a number of industries. This article examines these efforts in the encompassing organization of global commerce, in the pharmaceutical industry and among dye stuffs producers. Smaller organizations are generally better suited to monitor compliance and impose sanctions on members violating the codes and norms behind self-regulation. Even small organizations, however, are confronted with problems and there is also evidence of large and very complex organizations having established effective mechanisms as alternatives to public regulation. These experiences can be built into theories on self-regulation as a form of global governance.     

Fragmentation and the growth of local government

An assumption of the post-World War II metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient, increasing the cost and size of government. More recently, ‘polycentrists’ have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources. In this article, I explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered. Competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels.     

An Alternative Constitutional Treaty for the European Union

We propose an alternativeto the Constitutional Treaty drafted by theEuropean Convention. Our proposaleffectively limits the domain of governmentat the Union level. It takes the incentivesof the European public actors into account.We propose a second chamber of EuropeanParliament composed of delegates of theparliaments of the member states and asecond court composed of delegates of thehighest courts of the member states. Theseinstitutions will be the guardians of thesubsidiarity principle. The principle ofthe separation of powers is implemented byabolishing the Commission's monopoly oflegislative initiative and by curtailingthe Council's legislative role. Treatyamendments will not be drafted by aninter-governmental conference but by aninter-parliamentary conference. We proposeto change the method of financing andintroduce referenda.     

Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and the National Estuary Program

Currently, many approaches to solving policy problems seek to create community-based, less coercive solutions that are creating the conditions for the birth of new regional governmental institutions. We argue that networks form the core of these emergent structures and that federal programs can play a positive role in developing local networks. Our empirical work compares networks in estuaries included in National Estuary Program with networks in comparable estuaries that were not. We find that the networks in NEP areas span more levels of government, integrate more experts into policy discussions, nurture stronger interpersonal ties between stakeholders, and create greater faith in the procedural fairness of local policy, thus laying the foundation for a new form of cooperative governance.     

Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.     

Participatory Budgeting in Germany – A Review of Empirical Findings

Participatory budgeting (PB) is one of the most popular democratic innovations worldwide. PB is connected with high stakes regarding mobilizing political inactive citizens, efficient and effective budgetary policy as well as positive effects on citizens (e.g., civic education, democratic attitudes). However, in many Western countries empirical evidence for such benefits is scarce. This also holds for Germany. Since the conduction of PB demands financial and personnel resources, a thorough evaluation is necessary. This article systematically summarizes the current state of research to make the literature on PB in Germany accessible to international scholars as well as political and administrative practitioners. It focusses on the context (which municipalities conduct PB and why), process (role of local administration and council, participation, deliberation), and outcome/impact dimension (outcomes and impact on policies and citizens). To conclude, further research venues are briefly outlined, followed by an outlook on PBs future and practical implications.