The Logic of Private and Collective Action

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation .     

The Institutional Context of Market Ideology: A Comparative Analysis of the Values and Perceptions of Local Government CEOs in 14 OECD Countries

During recent decades, various versions of market practices have, in most nation states, diffused into the public sector. We analyse variations in the adoption of market ideologies and examine plausible explanations for these variations. Four managerial ideal types are constructed, based on their attitudes towards two dimensions of market ideology. Managerial attitudes and perceptions are conceived as embedded in a global process of diffusion highly affected by varying institutional preconditions. The impact of five types of institutional contexts is examined: the national context, the organizational context, the context of interaction, the context of socialization and the norms of the manager.     

Do Municipal Mergers Improve Fiscal Outcomes?

Improved fiscal management is a frequent justification for promoting boundary consolidations. However, whether or not this is actually the case is rarely placed under rigorous empirical scrutiny. Hence, this article investigates if fiscal outcomes are improved when municipalities are merged. The basic argument is that the conceptualisation of fiscal management in political science is often too narrow as it focuses on the budget and pays hardly any attention to balances in the final accounts and debts – elements of management which are central to policy making. On this background, the causal relationship between municipal mergers and fiscal outcomes is analysed. Measured on the balance between revenues and expenses, liquid assets and debts, municipal mergers improve the fiscal outcomes of the municipalities in a five‐year perspective, although the pre‐reform effects tend to be negative. For liquidity and debt, however, the improvement only entails re‐establishing the levels prior to the reform. The testing ground is the recent mergers of Danish municipalities, which, it is argued, constitute a quasi‐experiment. This forms the basis of a Difference‐in‐Difference design, allowing the alleviation of endogeneity problems and enabling causal inference. The analysis is based on administrative data from the Danish municipalities in the period 2003–11.     

Size,Democracy, and the Economic Costs of Running the Political System

The search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought. Given the validity of arguments for and against small units, one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes. However, the reform trend is uniform: units, often at the local level, are amalgamated to harvest scale effects. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems. Our testing ground is a recent Danish reform. It allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms. The reform was directed by the central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities, whereas 32 municipalities were left untouched. We thus have a quasi‐experiment with pre‐ and posttreatment observations for both an experiment and a control group. Our findings show that scale effects, measured as administrative costs per inhabitant, are considerable.     

Local government revenue policies in new Mexico

This examination of the revenue patterns of local governments in New Mexico finds that communities with the greatest social needs for public services-- small population rural areas, less affluent communities, and rapidly growing districts-- are precisely those that have the weakest revenue bases. Moreover, none of these types of disadvantaged jurisdictions receives above-average redistributive assistance from the federal government.Variations in revenue effort, especially among municipalities, exacerbate this problem because certain communities gain huge revenue windfalls which bear little relationship to either their social needs or taxing efforts but stem, rather, from fortuitous geographic positions. This advantage works its way through the entire revenue system, directly because state transfers are linked to place of collection and indirectly because of the overwhelming effect of revenue effort on revenue sharing allocations in the state. The local revenue system in New Mexico, therefore, works against the communities that have the greatest need for government services. Most of these inequities, however, do not appear to be the explicit goal of economic or political policy. Instead, they are the unintended consequences of a supposedly “neutral” allocation formula. This state of affairs certainly argues for policymakers paying more attention to the actual results of their policies.     

Internal or External Production and Satisfaction with the Chosen Sourcing in Danish Municipalities: Different Theoretical Explanations

Abstract

There is a large literature on both why local governments and public organisations choose internal or external production of services and what explains the performance of internal and external production. A range of different theories have been used to answer these questions. However, these studies show mixed results. In this study we investigate four theories: transaction cost economics, neoclassical economics, the resource-based view of strategy and institutional theory. Can these theories explain whether local governments choose internal or external production and can they explain the satisfaction with the internal and external production? Do the same variables explain the choice and the satisfaction? Based on a survey of four different service areas in Danish municipalities, it is shown that different theoretical variables explain the choice and satisfaction with the sourcing mode. Internal expertise is strongly related to the choice of internal or external production, whereas most transaction cost variables are unrelated to this choice. However, other variables such as supplier expertise and technological uncertainty are related to satisfaction with service production. The results corroborate the view that different variables are needed for explaining the performance of suppliers and the choice between internal and external suppliers. Furthermore, the results suggest that the study of local governments' sourcing may benefit from integrating theories focusing on internal expertise and markets. Studies may also benefit from integrating economic theories, which assume rationality, with institutional theory emphasising more unreflective and socially determined behaviour.     

An Argument for Reflexivity in Intelligence Work

In general, so it is argued in this article, the intelligence community would benefit from an agenda of greater and more conscious reflexivity. This increased self-awareness should as a minimum be applied to the areas of collection, analysis and communication, and it should bring members of the intelligence community to habitually reassess both procedures and standards of their work. Such a process promises to improve analysis, reduce misunderstandings in communication and increase public trust in the intelligence community. It will, in short, help the intelligence community prepare for a turbulent future.     

Contrarian investment philosophy in the American stock market: on investment advice and the crowd conundrum

Abstract

This paper contributes to the understanding of the role of crowds in the financial market by examining the historical origins and theoretical underpinnings of contrarian investment philosophy. Developed in non-scientific, practice-oriented ‘how to’ handbooks in 1920s and 1930s America, contrarian investment advice was aimed at so-called small investors rather than well-established market practitioners. Emerging out of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates about public participation in the stock market, the contrarians expanded on a widely held (amongst financial writers) scepticism about the investment and speculation skills (or lack thereof) of the masses and adopted ideas from the theoretical discipline of crowd psychology, whereby they positioned the mass (i.e. the crowd) in opposition to the successful investor. I argue that despite its idiosyncrasies, the contrarians’ conception of the market based on crowd psychology points to a fundamental fragility of market participants, which still lingers on in recent debates about the wisdom of financial market crowds.     

Public employees lining up at the polls—the conditional effect of living and working in the same municipality

Do public employees vote more frequently than private employees? The turnout of public employees has been of central interest to public choice scholars for almost a century. Utilizing a government records dataset that is not subject to over-reporting and differential social desirability bias, we find that public employees voted 11–12 percentage points more than their counterparts in the private sector. In a multivariate analysis, however, the effect is only four to five percentage points greater for local government public employees, which is in the lower range of previous studies. We are able to distinguish between local government and central government employees and show that the latter vote two percentage points less than the former. Controlling for the specific type of educational background does not explain the public–private turnout differential. Finally, the effect of working and voting in the same municipality is larger for local government employees than other citizens. This is in accordance with their greater incentives as they elect their future employer, though the effect size is surprisingly small.