Demographically disaggregated projections of prison populations

The need for improved long-run projections of prison populations has increased in recent years because of record-high numbers of inmates and severe overcrowding in state and federal prisons, and because of the growing importance of changing demographic factors in influencing corrections populations. A model is developed for projecting: general population demographics; demographic- and offense-specific arrest rates, imprisonment probabilities, and times served; and then the size and composition of prison populations. Model parameters are estimated for Pennsylvania and are shown to be sensitive to demographic factors, particularly age and race. Projections of future arrests, prison commitments, and prison population are developed for Pennsylvania using projections of demographic changes in the state's population. Arrests are expected to peak in 1980, prison commitments are expected to peak in 1985, and prison populations are expected to peak in 1990, with the subsequent declines reflecting the maturation of the postwar baby boom children out of the highly crime-prone ages and, somewhat later, out of the highly prison-prone ages.     

A comment on methodological concerns: A rejoinder

This rejoinder to Professor Cohen's Comment is intended to elaborate on approaches we utilized in our original paper. Some of our specification was necessitated by data availability (e.g., the specification of the sanction process). We attempt to clarify our approach in regard to the intervention process. We provide an explanation of the modeling that could underly a test of the hypothesis that the control effect is a product of the arrest process—a test that we had regarded as informative but peripheral to our main points. As noted, a significant part of that test utilizes the full range of control variables available to us. Finally, we enumerate what we felt to be the main points of our paper—points we are afraid might otherwise be lost in this discussion of methodology.     

Accountability and global governance: The view from paternalism

A standard view is that global governance institutions require strong accountability mechanisms to perform effectively and legitimately. Yet these institutions are much better at preaching than practicing accountability. A standard explanation for this gap references interests. For various reasons, institutions and their creators would rather be less than more accountable, and they are quite content to live with the hypocrisy. This article points to an alternative possibility: the public interest. An article of faith is that modern governance should be staffed by relatively autonomous experts who use their specialized knowledge for the greater good; accordingly, they cannot be accountable to those who are affected by their decisions. Too much democracy, therefore, can be a source of dysfunction. Yet expert authority's virtues also can become vices; namely, insulation from those affected by their decisions can also be a source of dysfunction, most closely associated with the “iron cage.” Although the possibility that expertise is both a virtue (effectiveness) and a vice (dysfunction) is well known in the literature on domestic governance, it has been neglected in discussions of global governance. Indeed, the dangers of, and dysfunctions associated with the iron cage might be greater in global governance than in domestic governance precisely because of the absence of institutional checks that often are produced by a preexisting social contract between the rulers and the ruled. I probe this possibility in the area of humanitarian governance.