Death penalty attitudes and conviction proneness

Attitudes toward the death penalty are consistently predictive of jurors' verdicts in criminal trials. Two studies were conducted to find out why. In Study 1, eligible jurors viewed a videotape showing conflicting testimony by a prosecution and defense witness in an assault case. Death-qualified subjects (those permitted to serve on capital juries) interpreted testimony in a manner more favorable to the prosecution than excludable subjects (those excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty), suggesting that differing interpretations of evidence may mediate the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and verdicts. In Study 2, the same jurors indicated their reactions to a number of hypothetical situations in which a jury had convicted an innocent defendant or acquitted a guilty one. Death qualified subjects expressed less regret concerning erroneous convictions and more regret concerning erroneous acquittals than excludable subjects. Theoretical interpretations of this pattern of results suggest that death qualified subjects may have a lower threshold of conviction than excludable subjects; thus the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and verdicts may also be mediated by differing thresholds of conviction.During the course of this research, William C. Thompson was supported, in part, by a National Science Foundation graduate fellowship.     

On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. For total costs the results support conventional wisdom, namely that the costs of regulations tend to be overestimated. This is true for 14 of the 28 rules in the data set discussed, while for only 3 rules were the ex ante estimates too low. For unit costs, however, the story is quite different. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit cost estimates are often accurate, and even when they are not, overestimation of abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, unit costs are consistently overestimated. The difference between the total‐cost and the unit‐cost results is caused by frequent errors in estimates of the effects of individual rules, which suggests, in turn, that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven both by difficulties in determining the baseline and by incomplete compliance. In cases of unit‐cost overestimation, unanticipated technological innovation appears to be an important factor — especially for economic incentive rules, although procedural and methodological explanations may also apply. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

Developmental Change in Adolescent Delinquency: Modeling Time-Varying Effects of a Preventative Intervention and GABRA2 Halpotype Linked to Alcohol Use

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Better integrating human developmental factors in genomic research is part of a set of next steps for testing gene-by-environment interaction hypotheses. This...     

“As Far as His Army Can Reach”: Military Movements and East–West Discord in Germany, 1945

This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith.