Unemployment and crime: the role of apprehension

An increase in the unemployment rate decreases the opportunity cost of crime and increases the crime rate according to standard microeconomics models. However, a large body of empirical research has shown that an increase in unemployment may increase or decrease crime. By incorporating the return to crime into standard economic models, this paper shows that an increase in unemployment, as in recessions, decreases the opportunity cost of crime and the return to crime as well. As a result, the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and depends on the apprehension rate. An increase in the unemployment rate tends to decrease the crime rate at lower apprehension rates, but to increase it at higher apprehension rates. An increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits does not necessarily reduce the crime rate, and the effect of more generous unemployment insurance on crime depends again on the apprehension rate.     

The play of approved method and authorized value in the administration of public issues

The goal of this piece is to construct a model for policy analysis that provides analysts with conceptual tools for studying policy as a discursive practice. Policy formulation is viewed as a generative process, as social relations set in the play of larger social formations. Fiction and non-fiction examples are used to develop a mode of analysis using Bourdieu's notion of discursive economies. These include The Milagro Beanjield War and an illustrative case study of the administration of CDBG's in a mid-sized city. The argument is made that this approach leads to a highly politicized view of the administration of public issues as the play between approved method and authorized value. Finally, the approach is connected to current policy-making tactics at the federal level.