Literatur

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game: Measuring and Explaining Changes in Parliamentary Rules in Austria,Germany, and Switzerland, 1945–2010

Questions of institutional change have recently received increased attention in comparative politics. Even though comparative legislative research has identified important effects of parliamentary rules on processes and outputs as well as large variation across countries, we know very little about changes in these rules. This article takes several steps towards mapping and explaining rule changes in European parliaments. Theoretically, it sketches a model explaining such changes based on the rational choice notion of institutions as endogenous equilibria. Methodologically, it proposes two complementary approaches to measure rule changes. In combination, these measures allow us to identify the content, relevance, and effects of changes in parliamentary rules. Empirically, the article provides the first systematic analysis of all changes in the parliamentary standing orders of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland since 1945. This analysis demonstrates that parliamentary rules are changed frequently and massively. It also identifies differences across countries and content areas that are largely in line with theoretical expectations.     

Functional unpleasantness: the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment

Economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self-interested. In divide-the-dollar ultimatum games, participants turn down offers that would make them objectively better off. Similarly, drivers stuck in a traffic jam fume at cars cruising by on the shoulder. Many stuck drivers would punish the moving ones if they could, even at some cost to themselves. Such strategies appear irrational because they make the punisher worse off than accepting the situation or offer. We examine explanations for costly punishment and relax the presumption that punishers themselves prefer cooperation, using evolutionary game theory to show how uncooperative punishers can support cooperation.     

Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000

Compared to U.S. political parties, parties in Italy (and Europe generally) are quite cohesive. Rarely do members of parliament vote against their copartisans in legislative divisions. Yet in Italy in recent years, legislators switch parties with seeming abandon. Between 1996 and spring 2000, one out of four deputies in the Chamber of Deputies switched parties at least once, compared to only 20 switches in the U.S. Congress from 1947 to 1997 ( Nokken 2000 ). We examine the relationship between switching and observed party unity in Italy by focusing on individual legislators' switching decisions and voting behavior. Overall, switchers move out of highly disciplined parties, suggesting that they switch partly in order to escape strong discipline.     

The Chat Room Moderator: Creating a Duty for Parents to Control Their Cyberbully

The advent of new technologies allowing people to communicate via the Internet has opened many windows to social interaction. At the same time, it has shifted the focus of child harassment from the playground to the computer. Instead of face‐to‐face bullying, children are now being bullied on the Internet, in a phenomenon known as “cyberbullying.” Cyberbullying is widespread, affecting generally twenty‐five percent of the child population in the United States. It is also more dangerous, as a child can be bullied at any time in the supposed comfort of his/her own home. To combat this behavior, many states have passed measures to ban or criminalize cyberbullying in school‐related settings. Nevertheless, children and adolescents continue to cyberbully their peers. Furthermore, most of these statutes do not address cyberbullying that occurs outside school or from a child's own home. Thus, this Note proposes that cyberbullying can be better combated by placing responsibility on parents to reasonably control their children in cases of cyberbullying. Based on the recently enacted ‘Cyber‐safety Act” from the Canadian Province of Nova Scotia and Restatement of Torts § 316, this Note proposes (1) placing tort responsibility on parents who know that their child is a cyberbully and do nothing about it and (2) allowing parents to avoid liability when their child truly cannot be controlled.

Key Points for the Family Court Community
• Cyberbullying is a major problem that must be addressed beyond the schoolyard.
• The law may provide recourse for the parents of a cyberbullying victim and can hold the parents of a cyberbully responsible.
• The Nova Scotia Cyber‐safety Act is a good model for holding parents liable for their child's acts because it balances the desire to end cyberbullying and the understanding that some minors are uncontrollable.