Use of force by female police officers

Do female police officers use force at the same rate as male police officers? This research examined the use of force by officers in a large, suburban police department during a seven-year period (1993-1999). Use of force reports completed by departmental policy for each use-of-force incident (n = 1,863) and data on arrests (n = 31,778) were examined. A rate of force, defined as the number of use-of-force incidents per one hundred arrests, was computed for male and female officers for each type of force used. A suspect-injury rate, defined as the number of suspects injured per one hundred arrests, also was computed.Force was used in only a small percentage (5.9 percent) of the arrests made. Injury to the suspect (not including the effects of OC spray) occurred in an even smaller percentage (1.6 percent) of arrests, and injury to the suspect resulting in treatment at a hospital (generally, emergency room treatment) occurred in a still smaller percentage (0.7 percent) of arrests.No statistically significant difference between female and male officers was found in the overall rate of force or in the rate of unarmed physical force. Female officers had a lower rate of weapon use when all types of weapons were considered together (p. < 0.05), but not when the different types of weapons were considered individually. Female officers also had a lower rate of any suspect injury (p. < 0.05), but there was no statistically significant difference in the rate of suspect injury resulting in treatment at a hospital. The differences found, even when statistically significant, were small in absolute terms.     

To bite or not to bite: Canine apprehensions in a large, suburban police department

There is a dearth of empirical research on the use of police canines. This article examines the use of canines in a large, suburban police department over a six-year period (1993-1998). Use of force reports, canine-apprehension reports, arrest data, and the canine unit's monthly activity reports were reviewed. Five rates were calculated: (1) canine-apprehension rate, (2) canine bite rate, (3) rate of bites resulting in any medical treatment, (4) rate of bites resulting in medical treatment at a hospital, and (5) officer injury rate. Of the suspects apprehended by canines, 14.1 percent were bitten, 9.1 percent received medical attention (on the scene or at a hospital), and 4.8 percent received medical attention at a hospital. The canine bite rate was significantly lower for non-White suspects than for White suspects. The use of rate-based information for the evaluation of policy and procedure concerning the use of police canines is discussed.     

Cognitive Dissonance in Social Work

Cognitive dissonance is a state of tension occurring when a person holds two psychologically inconsistent cognitions. For this study, 21 social workers who facilitate transracial adoption plans for Aboriginal children in British Columbia were interviewed: 1) Do social workers who facilitate transracial adoption plans for Aboriginal children experience cognitive dissonance? If so, in what ways? 2) How does cognitive dissonance impact them? 3) In what ways do social workers reconcile a sense of dissonance? Findings suggest that social workers do experience cognitive dissonance, that they are adversely impacted, and that they find ways to reconcile the cognitive dissonance.     

Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11

This article examines what has been learned since 11 September 2001 about the nature of twenty-first-century terrorism, the challenges that it poses, and how it must be countered. It attempts to better understand Usama bin Laden and the terrorist entity that he created and to assess whether we are more or less secure as a result of the U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and the pursuit of the al Qaeda network. The article considers these issues, placing them in the context of the major trends in terrorism that have unfolded in recent months and will likely affect the future course of political violence.     

Reply to pluchinsky and rapoport comments

The on-going Kashmir conflict has metamorphosed into a formidable insurgency that has attracted extremist groups fromPakistan and elements of Al-Qaeda. Given Al-Qaeda's modus operandi as an international network based on already existing domestic extremist groups, this article argues for the resolution of the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict as an avenue for shrinking the constituency of both Kashmiri domestic extremist groups and, by extension, that of Al-Qaeda's. Feasible options for resolutions are analyzed and an alternative proposition is suggested. An unresolved, or inadequately resolved, conflict is expected to lead the Kashmiri insurgency on a trajectory directed at the Pakistani government, possibly leading to that country's fragmentation and the subsequent expansion of Al-Qaeda's operational base. It is thus argued that the resolution of the Kashmir conflict be viewed as an integral component of the broader U.S. ‘war on terrorism’ and should compromise of delicate American diplomatic involvement in the India-Pakistan dialogue over Kashmir.